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ABSTRACT 
 
Community, Leadership, and Mass-Elite Relations: An Investigation into Political 
Leadership in the Chinese Villages in the Reform Era. (December 2007) 
Wei Shan, B.A., Peking University; 
M.A., Peking University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Robert Harmel 
 
What is the role of political leadership in the mechanisms that bind general masses and 
political elites behind a certain policy program?  And what factors account for the 
changes in political leadership?  The mechanisms connecting citizens and elites are 
crucial for regime stability.  The malfunction of such mechanisms, for instance, the 
absence of citizen-elite agreement on policy issues, or low levels of public trust in elites, 
undermines political support and legitimacy of the existing regime.  Focusing on rural 
communities in China, this dissertation attempts to examine how leader-follower 
relations in the grassroots communities influence mass-elite interactions, and how the 
community contextual factors shape those leader-follower relations. 
 
Existing studies tend to focus on the patron-client connections between peasant villagers 
and local officials, but largely to the neglect of other kinds of social relations.  Based on 
fieldwork interviews and panel survey data from China, I show that informal social 
relations, like leadership, have a significant impact on mass-elite opinion connections 
 iv
and public trust in local elites.  By leadership or leadership relations, I refer to the 
mutuality of leader-follower connection that is based on either authoritative or non-
authoritative, but largely non-coercive influence by both sides.  An element of non-
authoritative quality that binds a group of people (i.e. followers) behind a leader is 
especially important.  For this reason, leadership tends to be significant in a local 
community setting, such as in a village, that is thick with interpersonal relations.   
 
My study finds how formal elections and leadership relations in local communities co-
determine the direction of opinion influence between the local elite and ordinary citizens, 
and how leadership facilitates citizens’ belief that their local leaders are trustworthy.  
Further, my analysis shows that as market activities and state control penetrate into 
village communities, leadership relations themselves undergo changes in that the 
contextual factors of the rural community have tremendous predictive power on human 
networks within the community.  These changes imply that the political and economic 
reforms in the Chinese countryside have important consequences regarding local 
political leadership as well as mechanisms that bind masses and elites together.  
 v
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
From 2003 to 2004, I participated in two field research projects about rural governance 
in China1, with the intention of collecting information and data for my dissertation.  
Within around 10 months, I frequently traveled to and stayed in villages, interviewing 
village cadres and ordinary villagers.  I asked my interviewees such questions as “What 
are the major jobs of the village committee in you locality?” “Who is in charge of your 
village enterprises, the party secretary or the village chief?” and “How do you assess 
your relations with villagers today in compared with those relations ten years ago?”  
Consistently, I found that those grassroots party or state cadres complained of “it’s been 
getting hard to lead people.”  For instance, a couple of cadres told me that:  
 
In the early 1990s, villagers generally respected you (cadres) or even revered 
you… whatever you said had an authority over them (villagers)…now, um, you 
have to be really cautious, because they always want to challenge you, they 
always try to seize on your mistakes and file complaints to the upper-level 
government. 
 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of American Political Science Review. 
 
1 The Project of Rural Governance in China and the European Union-China Training 
Program on Village Governance, conducted by the Center for Chinese Agricultural 
Policy, Chinese Academy of Sciences. 
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To be a good village cadre, now you have to have a higher cultural level 
(educational level).  You must behave yourself…Say, you cannot get mad with 
drink at villagers any more…You must please the masses as much as possible.   
 
On the other side, an ordinary villager said: 
 
Ten years ago, it was the cadres who took care of absolutely everything.  We just 
followed whatever they said.  Now it (decision making) is getting open…Cadres 
are more civilized (than before)…They are playing nice guys and trying not to 
offend anyone.  
 
From these statements we can clearly observe a “decline” of local leadership: “leaders” 
have found difficult to lead as “followers” are becoming more challenging.  This is not 
unique to the Chinese villages.  In western societies, scholars also noticed a “crisis” or 
“depletion” of political leadership.  While James M. Burns attributed the crisis to “the 
mediocrity or irresponsibility of so many of the men and women in power” (1978:1) and 
Stanley A. Renshon contended that “increasing diversity and cultural conflict place 
strong pressures on leadership capital accumulation in societies like the United States” 
(2000:199), what factors account for the changes in leadership in rural China? Are there 
any important political implications of such changes?     
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Leadership has been a subject of contemplation and debate at lease since the time of 
Socrates (Kellerman, 1984; Bass, 1990; ReJai and Phillips, 2002).  It is important 
because it is a universal activity in humankind and it addresses one of the most 
fundamental issues in the human societies: how to organize people effectively.  The 
leader-follower relations lie at the center of interconnected social networks that link 
them physically or psychically with other human beings (Paige, 1977:1-3; see also 
Horner, 1997:270).  Within those social networks, effective leadership provides “higher-
quality and more efficient goods and services; it provides a sense of cohesiveness, 
personal development, and higher levels of satisfaction…and it provides an overarching 
sense of direction and vision, an alignment with the environment…” (Wart, 2003:214).  
Even as the post-materialist values rise up in western democracies, as considerable 
segments of the public pursue new social movements characterized as “a very limited 
internal division of labor and a low degree of differentiation of specific functional roles, 
especially elite roles” (Schmitt, 1989:584; Inglehart, 1971), leadership is still a 
meaningful category.  Its importance points not to hierarchic authority but to leaders’ 
capability to mobilize mass constituencies (Schmitt, 1989:594; Rohrshneider, 1993). 
 
Thus far social scientists have approached leadership in four distinctive ways (House 
and Aditya, 1997; Horner, 1997; Antonakis, et al., 2004).  The first trend examines the 
attributes of leaders.  This theoretical tradition believes that it is certain individual 
characteristics that differentiate leaders from nonleaders.  Those characteristics include 
gender, height, physical energy, personality, as well as other psychological traits.  A 
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second major paradigm of leadership study is known as the behavioral school of 
leadership.  It focuses on how leaders behave and relates these behaviors (for instance, 
task-oriented or person-oriented behaviors) to various criteria of leader effectiveness.  A 
third theoretical approach seeks to understand leadership from the situation in which 
leaders exist.  The effectiveness of leadership is contingent on the interactions between 
situational variables and leader personality and leader behaviors.  Environment of 
leadership are conceptualized as different levels of favorability for influence.  Finally, a 
recent school of leadership theories emphasizes the dyadic relationship between leaders 
and followers.  The interactions or exchanges of the two parties are important for the 
nature and effectiveness of leadership.  This school can be labeled as “the relational 
approach.” 
 
Three Limitations of Existing Leadership Studies 
 
Although there are such developments, in his groundbreaking volume Burns reminded 
us that “leadership is one of the most observed and least understood phenomena on 
earth” (1978:2).  After almost 30 years of the publication of Burns’ book, however, this 
statement remains as valid as it originally was.  The study of leadership is still far from 
satisfied, especially in the political science field.  In spite of the great amount of 
researches, we’ve made little progress in search of regularities and standards by which to 
conceptualize and evaluate leadership.  
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Three limitations in the existing research, I believe, have constrained us from fully 
exploring the phenomena of leadership.  The first one is the narrow focus of our studies.  
While there are four distinctive theoretical traditions, three of them share a common 
feature: they all center at one party of the leadership structure—the leader, and more or 
less, ignore those being led.2  No matter whether the study focuses on leader traits, 
leader behavior, or the interaction between the leader and her environment, the role of 
follower characteristics, the role of the leader-follower interactions, are excluded from 
the research landscape.  This narrowness especially undermines leadership studies in 
political science, because political scientists have so far yet to develop any theories 
along the relational approach as sociologists of industrial organizations have done in the 
vertical dyadic linkage theory or the leader-member exchange theory (Dansereau, 1995; 
Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995).  Most studies of political leadership are simply studies of 
political leaders.  Even Burns, who made the most extraordinary effort to push political 
leadership study away from the leader-centered traditions, does not completely avoid 
this limitation.  Although he accepted that leadership is “inseparable from follower’s 
needs and goals,” he insisted that leaders take the major part in the connections with 
followers and ignored the possibility that followers could take initiatives.  He wrote, “the 
leader takes the initiative in making the leader-led connection; it is the leader who 
creates the links that allow communication and exchange to take place” (Burns, 1978:19, 
20).  Joseph C. Rost, another great scholar in political leadership, criticized the dominant 
tendency “of focusing only on the leader” and argued that “only people who are active in 
                                                 
2 The fourth tradition, the leader-follower relational approach, is an exception to this 
pattern.  
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the leadership process are followers” (1993:27, 108).  However, he also paid much more 
attention to the leaders rather than the followers in his inspiring book.  Narrow focus 
limits further development in this field. 
 
A second limitation that restricts the development of leadership study is ethnocentrism 
or parochialism.  In an extensive and insightful field survey on the social scientific study 
of leadership, House and Aditya present a criticism of the existing scholarship 
(1997:409-10): 
 
The leadership literature is based on a limiting set of assumptions, mostly 
reflecting Western industrialized culture.  Almost all of the prevailing theories of 
leadership, and about 98% of the empirical evidence at hand, are rather distinctly 
American in character: individualistic rather than collectivistic,…assuming 
centrality of work and democratic value orientation, and emphasizing assumptions 
of rationality rather than asceticism, religion, or superstition.  Further, a number of 
important topics are largely ignored or only very recently addressed in the 
leadership literature. 
 
This parochial trend in leadership studies mean that leadership in most non-Western 
cultures hasn’t been fully investigated.  If leadership is a type of human activities, these 
activities must be embedded in a larger cultural background.  National, community, or 
organizational cultures create common experience, common language and rhetorical 
 7
understanding that facilitate the communication between citizens and political elites, 
which in turn promotes the exercise of leadership (Renshon, 2001:207).  In addition, as 
culture shapes people’s preferences or behavior, people from different types of culture 
may be sensitive to different types of leadership.  Citizens from Eastern cultures are 
more likely to identify with transformational leadership than people from Western 
cultures (Lord, et al., 2001:325).  As these arguments stand, the parochial-oriented 
leadership study constitutes a real problem: we have so far looked at only the tip of the 
iceberg while we should examine its entire body.  It will be fruitful if leadership scholars 
look beyond the setting of the Western industrialized societies to explore leadership in 
different types of culture.  This investigation may provide new directions for the 
development of future leadership theory and empirical research.  
 
A third limitation of current leadership study is unique to political science.  That is, we 
are largely ignorant of developments in other social science disciplines and hence benefit 
very little from wisdom of psychologists, sociologists, and management scholars.  Since 
late 1970s, as a result of the rise of the vertical dyadic paradigm (Dansereau, 1995; 
Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995), the mainstream leadership researches have been largely 
focused on the relational approach, that is, how the interactions or exchange between 
leaders and followers make a difference.  Students of political leadership are generally 
outside this paradigm.  On the other hand, leadership scholars in other disciplines did not 
hesitate when they introduced new concepts or research approaches into their own fields.  
For example, political scientist Burns (1978) proposed the concept of “transformational 
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leadership.”  In the past three decades, this concept has inspired a huge amount of 
research in organizational sociology and management studies; whereas in political 
science there have been very few follow-up studies.     
 
Mass-Elite Relations 
 
In this dissertation research I attempt to investigate the effects of political leadership on 
mass-elite relations in the Chinese rural communities.  How does the particular 
context—rural communities—influence local leadership in an ear of political and 
economic reform?  What is the impact of the leader-follower relations on mass-elite 
interactions in the grassroots?  In two aspects mass-elite relations are addressed.  The 
first aspect is the opinion linkage between citizens and political office holders, that is, 
how the two parties achieve opinion congruence on policy issues through mutual 
influences.  The other aspect is the attitudinal linkage between the two----the belief of 
the general public that they trust their rulers. 
 
Both types of mass-elite connections are crucial for our understanding of regime stability.  
Stability is a central problem in Chinese politics.  Since the economic reform began in 
the late 1970s, one debate has been going on in the scholarly community of Chinese 
politics: will this dramatic economic change lead to a stable political transformation or 
lead to a catastrophic regime collapse (Goldstone, 1995; Huang, 1995)?   For a better 
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understanding of this debate, we need more systematical investigations into mass-elite 
relations. 
 
Why is opinion linkage important?  Normatively, democratic theorists contend only if 
political elites share the preferences of citizens, the rule of elites can be regarded as 
legitimate (Pitkin, 1967:209-10).  As Robert Dahl’s justification of democracy, “a 
democratic government provides an orderly and peaceful process by means of which a 
majority of citizens can induce the government to do what they most want it to do and to 
avoid doing what they most want it not to do” (1989:95).  Apart from the normative 
aspects, political scientists have long realized that citizen-elite linkages are “an essential 
element of any consideration of systemic stability regardless of the type of political 
system analyzed” (Sullivan, 1974:637).  The absence of linkages or the low levels of 
connections between citizens and elites can have serious political consequences, 
especially in societies experiencing profound economic and political reforms.  In those 
societies, if political office holders “are significantly out of step with popular preferences, 
implementing difficult or controversial policies will be that much harder; similarly, if 
ordinary citizens have preferences that differ from those of the elite…they could come to 
view the political and economic reforms as either meaningless or lacking legitimacy.  
Under these circumstances the citizenry may not only fail to comply with the reforms 
but they may act to undermine them” (Miller, et al., 1995:30).  That is to say, opinion 
linkage is crucial for regime stability.   
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Political trust is also critical to a polity’s stability.  It is an important component of 
political support and it constitutes the basis of legitimacy for a government (Easton, 
1965:273).  As Hetherington (1998) found in a study of the American political system, 
declining trust is a powerful cause of dissatisfaction with political elites.  “Low trust 
helps create a political environment in which it is more difficult for leaders to succeed” 
(1998:791).  Lack of trust reduces politicians’ “room to maneuver when it encounters 
difficulties in performing its more immediate political tasks” (Shi, 2001:401).  Trust is 
especially crucial for societies experiencing rapid political and economic reforms 
(Mishler and Rose, 2001).  In those societies, as there are great amount of uncertainty 
and risk, the political regime is particularly in need for political support and room to 
maneuver.   
 
Précis of the Study  
 
By examining the mass-elite connection questions, I hope to contribute to the literature 
of political leadership in three aspects.  First, this research conceptualizes leadership as a 
dyadic relationship between the leader and the follower.  The follower in this 
relationship is not a passive recipient any more, but an actor helps in the formation of the 
leadership connection.  This differs from most political leadership studies that 
concentrate only on political leaders.  Second, the empirical setting of the study is the 
Chinese villages, a non-Western, less-industrialized, and more collectivistic setting.  In 
such a context, what are the antecedents to the formation of leadership relations?  And 
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how do these relations make a difference?  To seek answers to these questions, I hope, 
will facilitate political leadership research moving toward a non-parochial direction.  
Finally, this dissertation attempts to integrate leadership theories from other disciplines 
into political inquiries.  Theoretical and empirical analyses of the emergence and impact 
of leadership benefit from theories in sociology of organizations and psychology.   
 
Studies of Chinese political leadership have been mostly concentrated on the party or 
state leaders at the national level (Pittinsky and Zhu, 2005).  And without surprise, most 
of such researches are leader-centered.  That is, the so-called leadership studies are 
actually studying individual political elites.  To date, there is no serious effort to 
examine political leadership at the grassroots level with a non-leader-centered approach.  
To make this research expedition more interesting, the Chinese villages have been in 
rapid transformation.  Twenty-five years ago, most villages were dominated by 
traditional crop raising, largely isolated from external market, and overwhelmed by 
traditional customs and culture.  Today, most villages are involved in economic 
activities related to market.  Many of them have disappeared in the overspreading cities.  
A great number of young and middle-aged labors cannot live with the narrow margin of 
profit from crop farming any more, moving to cities to seeking a better living.  
Traditional culture and values in villages are on the decline or even collapsing.  Political 
structures have been rebuilt as well.  For the first time, competitive elections for 
administrative positions have been introduced into villages.  It’s remained unexplored 
how these political and economic changes affect leader-follower relations in villages and 
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what are the political consequences of those relations.  It is the purpose of this 
dissertation to deal with these issues. 
 
The empirical analysis is based on both interview data and quantitative survey data. 
From August 2003 to April 2004, and December 2004, I conducted fieldwork in six 
provinces (Shaanxi, Anhui, Chongqing, Zhejiang, Hunan, and Jiangsu).  I interviewed 
party-state cadres at the county, township, and village levels, as well as a small number 
of villagers.  Questions involved village elections, economic development, the actual 
operation of the three levels of administration, and mass-cadre relations.  The 
quantitative data are from 1990 and 1996 Four-County Study of Chinese Local 
Government and Political Economy Survey, which were collected by scholars from the 
University of Michigan and Peking University.  Respondents were drawn from a 
stratified probability- proportionate-to-size sample in four counties from four provinces.3  
The 1990 survey includes 1149 villagers and 59 village cadres from 59 villages (one 
cadre per village, including 34 party secretaries and 25 village administrative chiefs); the 
1996 study includes 1248 villagers and 58 cadres from 58 villages (one cadre per village, 
composed of 31 party secretaries and 27 village administrative chiefs).  59.13% of 
respondents in the 1996 survey were also surveyed in the 1990 study. 
 
In addition to this introduction, the rest chapters proceed in the following order.  Chapter 
II discusses theoretical issues of leadership and mass-elite relations.  While existing 
                                                 
3 For a detailed description of the dataset, see Manion, 1996 and Manion, 2006.  
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literature on mass-elite relations in rural communities appealed to the totalitarian model 
and the patron-client model, this research seeks to contribute to this literature from the 
perspective of leadership study.  Based on a psychological theory, I focus on one 
important aspect of leadership: the interpersonal psychological connection between 
citizens and cadres.  This type of relations is especially significant in a local community 
setting, such as in a village, that is thick with interpersonal interactions.  While the 
political and economic transformation of local communities restructures the context 
where leadership is embedded, the formation and styles of leadership become contingent 
on this transformation.  Furthermore, the existence of leadership relations between 
masses and elites may have a double-sided impact on the mass-elite relations.  On the 
one hand, leadership weakens democratic representative linkage between voters and 
elected village heads.  On the other, leadership promotes citizens’ belief that party-state 
cadres are trustworthy. 
 
Chapter III investigates the determinants of community leadership, specifically, how 
changes in the community setting affect the formation and styles of leadership.  
Variances in the community context are conceptualized as two dimensions of changes in 
modes of governance in communities: one is from a clan mode to a market mode of 
governance, and another is from a clan mode to a bureaucratic mode.  Being measured as 
the village-market and village-state relations, these two dimensions are found to have a 
significant impact on both the emergence and styles of leadership between village cadres 
and villagers.  Other community factors, such as village elections and kinship networks, 
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are also taken into account.  Results point to the significant destructive effects of 
dominant kinships on leadership relations.  
 
The fourth and fifth chapters deal with the effects of leadership when it is an 
independent variable.  Chapter IV provides an empirical analysis of the association 
between leadership and representation.  Representative linkage is the election-based 
connections between masses and elites, through which public opinion exerts influences 
on elite opinion.  Defined as an interpersonal influence process, leadership has an impact 
on the opinion linkages between the general public and political officials.  Based on the 
analysis of the mutuality of mass-elite opinions, this chapter argues that in the Chinese 
countryside, leadership may play as a negative force to representation—it weakens the 
impact of public opinion on local cadres. 
 
Chapter V, as the third empirical chapter, probes into the effects of leadership on another 
aspect of mass-elite linkage—to what extent the general mass trust those political office 
holders.  According to the Leader-Member Exchange theory, fully developed leadership 
relations are characterized as a high-quality interpersonal interaction, that is, leaders and 
followers are involved in the exchange of psychological satisfaction, positive affect, 
respect, and loyalty.  Political elites who are recognized as leaders are more likely to 
receive trust from citizens than non-leader elites.  Empirical findings support this 
argument. 
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The last chapter is the conclusion.  It surveys the possible connection between leadership 
and social capital, suggesting that leadership can be viewed as a kind of vertical social 
capital.  Leadership capital plays an important role in rural community governance, 
especially through affecting citizen-elite relations.  Also, in this section I make some 
predictions regarding changes in rural leadership in the near future and their effects upon 
rural politics in China.  Finally, this chapter discusses the limitations of this dissertation 
research and makes some suggestions for future analysis of local political leadership in 
Chinese villages or elsewhere. 
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CHAPTER II 
COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP AS AN INFORMAL SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP 
 
This dissertation research explores political leadership and mass-elite relations in the 
Chinese villages during the reform era.  What are the determinants of the changes in the 
leader-follower relations?  How do the leadership relations influence mass-elite linkages 
in villages?  This chapter discusses general theoretical issues concerning these questions.  
More detailed theoretical discusses as well as hypotheses are presented in the next 
several chapters.  In this chapter I first review existing literature on mass-elite relations 
in rural China; then address the concept of leadership and define it as a type of informal 
social relationship; finally I discuss why the leadership relationship is politically 
important in Chinese rural communities.  
 
Mass-Elite Relations in Chinese Villages: Formal vs. Informal 
 
So far there have been generally two theoretical traditions to examine mass-elite 
relations in the Chinese countryside since 1949: one focuses on formal party-state 
institutions and mechanisms of political economic control; the other explores informal 
connections between local officials and citizens.  In the first tradition lie the totalitarian 
model, the predatory state theory, and the election-based citizen-elite linkages.  Along 
the approach addressing informal relations, there is the patron-client theory.   
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Since the field of Chinese politics began to grow in 1960s, it was once popularly 
accepted that Chinese society could be characterized as a totalitarian model, with a 
highly centralized political power and an unprecedented penetration of the state into 
society (Li, 1998:18).  The grassroots mass-elite relationship is viewed as party cadres’ 
absolute power over the general masses.  Elites try to control and mobilize the public 
and suppress any independent claims and actions (Oi, 1985:239).  When China began to 
open its door to the world in 1980s, the totalitarian paradigm was gradually abandoned 
by most researchers largely because it did not accurately reflect the political reality any 
more (Dittmer, 1996).  Thereafter, scholars have been seeking alternative explanations 
for the changing mass-elite relations (e.g. Shue, 1988; Walder, 1995).  Inspired by the 
concept of “predatory state,”4 Lu (1997) argued that the local state in the Chinese 
countryside is growing predatory.  The decline of the totalitarian system weakened the 
central control over local agents.  Officials in the local state apparatus have therefore 
enjoyed considerable autonomy and discretion, which enables them to maximize their 
own interests which are not necessarily congruent with the central policy.  As a result, 
unruly exaction from peasants increases without effective restrictions, which has 
significantly deteriorated citizen-cadre relations in the countryside and aroused a lot of 
collective petitions, protests, and even violent unrests (Lu, 1997; Bernstein and Lu, 
2000).       
 
                                                 
4 In his original study about the Third World state, Evans (1989) proposed the concept 
“predatory state,” which is characterized as patrimonial tradition, excessive 
bureaucratization, and control of the state apparatus by a small group of individuals.   
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While the predatory local state theory explains well the unleashed taxation burden of 
peasants and conflictual mass-elite relations in the past decade,5 it discounts peasants’ 
ability to influence elites, affect policy implementation, and pursue interests.  As the 
political reform proceeds further into villages, another line of studies examines how 
institutional changes encourage ordinary villagers to exert influence on local party 
secretaries and village chiefs.  Most of such studies concentrate on the effects of village 
elections.  Since 1987 the communist government has promoted free and competitive 
elections for positions in the village administration (O’Brien and Li, 2000).  Although 
the quality of enforcing elections varies substantially cross regions, systematic 
investigations have revealed that those elections did affect the mass-elite linkage at the 
grassroots level.  Based on survey data analysis, Manion (1996) found that village 
elections in China made village leaders more responsive to their constituencies.  
Electoral contestation has established a representative linkage between voters and 
elected officials which is familiar to Western democracies.  Further analysis suggested 
that village elections encourage villagers to ask for citizenship rights they’ve never 
enjoyed (O’Brien, 2001; Li and O’Brien, 1996), and promote villagers’ belief that 
governmental authorities are responsive to their demands and therefore they are more 
active in participating in local politics and affecting policy implementation (Li, 2003).    
 
Another line of theoretical tradition contends that it is insufficient to concentrate only on 
formal structures and mechanisms and more intellectual attentions should be paid to the 
                                                 
5 As a response to the rising collective protests of peasants, the agricultural tax, as well 
as a batch of other unruly exactions, was abolished all over the country in 2005. 
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informal dimension of Chinese politics.  The most important theoretical framework to 
address informal mass-elite relations in the rural grassroots is the patron-client model.  
Departing from the formal politics approach, the clientelist model views the mass-elite 
connections as more personalistic, subjective, and flexible.  The patron-client 
relationship is a vertical dyadic linkage of two persons “of unequal status, power or 
resources,” who involve direct personal attachment to each other and exchange of favors 
or assurances of aid (Lande, 1977:20).  This type of interpersonal linkage most likely 
emerges in societies with an imperfect market and a weakly developed legal system 
(Duara, 1990:280).  Individual peasants or villagers depend on a powerful local patron, 
usually a party branch secretary or a village chief in the Chinese case, for scarce 
resources such as land, goods, or opportunities.  In return, the patron receives support, 
loyalty, or services from peasants.  Since in the Chinese countryside the formal channels 
for participation and interest articulation are only weakly established, through the 
patron-client alliance rural citizens develop an effective channel to interact with the 
party-state, to affect policy implementation, and to pursue their particular interests.  Also 
through this alliance, local cadres have their basis of power strengthened (Oi, 1985; Oi, 
1989; Yan, 1995).      
 
Although the patron-client model provides valid and inspiring explanations for mass-
elite relations during both the pre-reform and the reform period, in the recent decades it 
has been on a shaky ground as several of its assumptions are challenged.  First, the 
clientelist relationship presumes peasants live at subsistence level, yet this is not the case 
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in contemporary China any more (Burns, 1979), especially after more than 20 years of 
rapid economic growth.  Second, the dependence of peasants on local patrons for scarce 
resources has been weakened during the market transition.  As mass media and public 
transportation expand further into remote counties, and more importantly, as market 
economic activities penetrate into every village and rural households become accustom 
to buying and selling at the free market, villagers do not have to go to village cadres for 
necessary capital, information, or technology for their production.6  More and more rural 
labors move into cities to make a living, which further ruins the resource dependence 
linkage between villagers and their local cadres.  Finally, formal channels of 
participation and interest articulation have been getting stronger.  In 2002, a Carter 
Center report indicated almost all of the 700,000 villages throughout the country had 
held at least one round of village elections.  Those elections were legally required to be 
free and competitive.  The central government also has attempted to improve governance 
institutions in the grassroots, for example, institutionalizing all-village meetings, making 
village budgets more transparent, lodging complaints with special bureaus (O’Brien and 
Li, 1995).  These measures have encouraged rural citizens to participate in politics 
through the formal channels, therefore reduced their incentive to seek political equities 
through the clientelist connections.  
 
                                                 
6 Today, there may be only one key element for production still under the control of local 
cadres: land.  In the Chinese system, land in rural area is under a collective ownership, 
that is, owned by the village community.  The cadres make decisions on land allocations 
and issue permits for house constructions.  But more and more central regulations have 
set restrictions on local cadres’ power about land use, which to some extent undermined 
the resource dependence of peasants. 
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Leadership as Informal Social Relations 
 
In this research I would like to go along the informal politics tradition and explore the 
role of leadership as an informal social relationship that could affect mass-elite relations.  
As we’ve discussed in the introduction chapter, leadership is one of most fundamental 
human activities, yet we know little about its role in connecting humankind.  Unlike 
most conventional studies of political leadership, which view leadership as the traits or 
behavior of leaders, this research defines leadership as an interpersonal relationship, that 
is, an informal social interaction.   I am going to develop and test a theoretical 
framework about the determinants and consequences of leadership relations in rural 
communities.  
 
Why informal social relations?  
Why to study leadership as a type of informal social relations?  First of all, informal 
relations are crucial in Chinese politics.  Although the Communist government has made 
achievements in constructing formal institutions, the informal dimension remains 
“extremely” important (Dittmer, 1995).  This is partly because of “the unsettled nature of 
the Chinese political scene throughout the twentieth century,” and partly because of “the 
traditional aversion to law and a cultural preference for more moralistic and personalized 
authority relations” (Dittmer, 1995:1).  As a contemporary Confucian scholar pointed 
out, in the traditional Chinese culture there is neither the division of private and public 
spheres, nor the dichotomy of individualism and collectivism, but a relationship-based 
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orientation (guanxi benwei) (Liang, 1974).  The “relationship” here refers to a 
personalized informal connection.  These personalized relationships are so pervasive in 
the political system that superiors and subordinates fit together “not by a book of rules 
but by the more deeply ingrained rules of proper human relationship.  Authority lies not 
in an objectified body of laws or moral codes, but in subjective understandings of the 
meaning of leadership, superior-subordinate relationships…” (Pye, 1995:39).  In such a 
political culture, actors cannot rely on one’s formal power base to defend one’s personal 
interests; official power can be easily divested of if there is no support from informal 
connections (Dittmer, 1995:11-12).  As a result, the relationship between formal and 
informal politics is “fluid and ambiguous—informal groups are often absorbed into 
formal structures, and formal structures in turn operate with a great deal of infirmity” 
(Dittmer, 1995:14).  In addition, as the clientelist paradigm is getting disconnected with 
the political reality, we need new conceptual tools to help us understand the informal 
dimension of Chinese politics.  Under such circumstances, it is rather meaningful to 
explore how local political leadership plays as an informal relationship and affects mass-
elite connections. 
 
Leadership as relationship 
One of the latest developments of leadership theory is the exploration of dyadic 
relationship between individual leaders and followers, such as Vertical Dyad Linkage 
(VDL) model (Dansereau, Graen, and Haga, 1975), Leader Member Exchange theory 
(LMX) (Graen, Novak, and Sommerkamp, 1982), and Individualized Leadership 
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approach (Dansereau, Alutto, and Yammarino, 1984; Dansereau, 1995).  The whole 
thrust of these theories is that leadership is a relationship between the leader and the led; 
this relationship takes place at the dyadic level.  The leader acts as a role sender, sending 
different information about role expectations to different subordinates and rewards those 
who satisfy these expectations.  The subordinate is role recipient and responds to the sent 
roles in distinctive ways (Katz and Kahn, 1978).  Followers are not passive role 
receivers; they may reject, accept, or renegotiate roles sent from their leaders.  Through 
this process, superiors become leaders and subordinates become followers. 
 
As a dyadic relationship between the leader and the follower, leadership is actually a 
process of interpersonal influence.  In this process, one party uses noncoercive influence 
to direct, arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives or intentions of the other party/parties 
(Burns, 1978; Bass, 1990; Rost1993).  According to this definition, we need to 
distinguish the leader-follower relationship from the elite-mass tie.  Firstly, the leader-
follower relationship is not synonymous with the elite-mass connection.  Elites are not 
necessarily leaders and citizens are not automatically followers.  Political elites are those 
who hold political offices, in charge of policy making and implementation.  That is, this 
concept is based on formal positions such as executives, legislators, bureaucrats, and 
party officials (Paige, 1977:86).  In contrast, political leaders are those elites who are 
actually or perceived to be involved in the interpersonal influence with their followers.  
The elite-mass relationship is not a leader-follower association unless both elites and 
masses are actually engaged in the leadership process.   
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Secondly, elites imply inequality in power and high positions on a ladder of formal 
hierarchic system.  Elites have an influence on the masses because they possess official 
authority and power, and it is the legal obligation of the general public to comply with 
them.  By contrast, leadership can make a difference without resorting to formal 
authority, power, or coercion.  In the leadership process, the leader seeks to direct, 
induce, or satisfy the follower’s motives or intentions, and thus changes the follower’s 
attitudes or opinions.  In this sense, we see leadership as an informal social relationship, 
differing from formal citizen-official relations. 
 
Finally, in the mass-elite dyad, the main direction of influence is “form the top down, 
not from bottom up; elites are expected to dominate not to be responsive” (Paige, 
1977:86-87).  In comparison, the influence relationship in leadership can be reciprocal; 
leaders and followers influence one another.  Usually, leaders seek to lead or direct 
followers’ opinions.  Yet as Rost points out, followers are not passive recipients, they 
“are active agents in the leadership relationship…(T)here are times when followers may 
exert more influence than leaders, times when they may seize the initiative, and times 
when their purposes drive the relationship” (1993:112).  More importantly, followers 
participate in building leadership relations.  They may actively choose a leader and 
decide to follow him or her, based on how much the leader is perceived to represent their 
values and identities (Dixon, 2003; Shamir, et al., 1993).  A leader would be ineffective 
“if followers do not accept and commit themselves to a leader’s vision” (Erez and Earley, 
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1993:184).  Hence, leaders often need to be responsive to followers’ needs or opinions in 
order to sustain a leadership connection. 
 
In summary, leadership is an informal type of social relationship, which is essentially 
different from mass-elite relations that are based on formal authority.  In the following 
sections of this dissertation research, I use “elite” to refer to cadres, officials, or 
bureaucrats who hold official positions.  Only when these figures are actually involved 
in leadership relations, I refer to them as “leaders” and thus the citizens become 
“followers.” 
 
Furthermore, although both leadership and clientelism are informal relations, they differ 
in at least two key aspects.  First, they are constructed on different basis.  The patron-
client relationship is possible because of the resource dependence of peasants on local 
powerful figures; whereas the leadership relation is based on interpersonal influence, 
which is originally from personal attractions, persuasions, ambitions, or desires.  On the 
other hand, although both are involved in interpersonal exchanges, what is exchanged is 
different.  For patrons and clients, they trade physical interests for loyalty or services; for 
leaders and followers, they exchange visions, motivations, affect, trust, and satisfaction.  
Simply speaking, while the clientelist tie must be engaged in physical interests, the 
leadership relation is largely a psychological bond.  
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Leadership Category Agreement (LCA) 
Measuring leadership is no easy task.  In political science, leadership was traditionally 
measured as the effects or impact of leadership (Burns, 1978:22; Blondel, 1987:80): how 
much difference the leadership makes; how much impact the leader has on the societies 
they rule.  There are two problems with this “effect” measurement.  First, some types of 
leadership may not necessarily produce observable impact.  There could be situations 
that the intended effect of leadership is “no effect” or “no action.”  Second, this is not a 
measure of leadership itself, but the result of the existence of leadership.  Validity 
problem could emerge from this measuring strategy.7   
 
As we define leadership as a process in which one party directs, arouses, engages, and 
satisfy the motives and intentions of the other party, a direct measure of leadership 
should tap to what degree the leader has directed or made differences in the follower’s 
intentions and motives.  Such measurement requires sophisticated survey battery and 
techniques to catch the psychological process in both the leader’s and the follower’s 
mind.  In the absence of such data, in this research I do not examine directly the 
leadership process.  Instead, the focus is on a crucial antecedent to leadership, the 
agreement on leadership categories between potential leaders and followers. 
 
                                                 
7 For example, we observe an economic growth during the rule of a certain leader.  
According to the “effect” measurement, we can use this growth to indicate the “degree” 
of leadership.  However, the economic growth may be in fact due to good weather or 
new technology.  In this case, the “effect” measure of leadership does not measure 
leadership at all. 
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Here we benefit from a psychological theory: leadership categorization theory, which 
addresses contributors to the formation or emergence of leadership relations.  
Psychologist Lord and his colleagues (Lord, et al., 1984; Load, et al., 1982) have found 
that the perceptual process of followers in identifying leaders is largely a process of 
categorization.  Individuals usually store in mind a set of categories regarding the image 
of what the typical leader is like.  Most people from the same culture generally share the 
same sets of categories (Gerstner and Day, 1994).  These categories describe the 
“prototypes” of leaders.  A prototype is “an abstract composite of the most 
representative attributes of category members” (Lord, et al., 1984:346).  When people 
observe behaviors of an office holder, they “note particular salient characteristics and 
compare them against their own leadership prototypes” (Shamir, 1995:24-25).  The 
better the match between the behavior of a target individual and a prototype in the 
observer’s mind, the more likely for that individual to be perceived as a “leader” by the 
observer.  That is, the degree to which an official’s leading behavior fits a citizen’s 
leadership prototypes is positively related to the emergence of leadership.  Figure 2.1 
illustrates the basic logic of this theory. 
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Match Not match 
Behavior of a target official (potential leader) 
Prototypes of an observer (potential follower) 
Potential 
leadership 
relation 
No leadership 
relation 
Figure 2.1: Leadership Categorization Theory
 
 
 
Based on this theory I generate a variable, Leadership Category Agreement (LCA 
thereafter), which is the degree of match between citizens’ preferred leadership 
categories and behaviors of political elites.  We can see this variable essentially indicates 
how much leadership supplies of elites meet citizens’ leadership expectation.   A high 
score of LCA has a positive impact on the possibility of a leadership relationship.  
Although this variable does not directly measure the established leader-follower 
relationship per se, it addresses one crucial aspect of leadership process: the level of 
congruence between public expectation and elite supplies regarding leadership.  This 
factor may not only be critical to the formation of leadership relations, but have an 
impact on mass-elite linkages such as opinion agreement or political trust.  In the 
following empirical analyses I am going to discuss this issue in more details. 
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Leadership styles 
Another concept we need to examine is leadership styles.  In literature, leader style is 
defined as “an amalgam of the personal characteristics an individual possesses, and thus 
is reflective of one’s intelligence, personality, social, and political skill.”  It refers to “the 
manner in which the behavior is expressed rather than the behavior itself”(Hall, et al., 
2004:521).  In other words, leader style influences how a leader is perceived and 
evaluated by followers; followers may respond in a correspondent way.  For instance, a 
dictatorial leader tends to make decisions in an arbitrary manner; followers of this leader 
are likely to be obedient and passive in the decision-making process.  In this research we 
define two types of leader style: paternal and fraternal leaders.  A fraternal leader usually 
acts like a considerate superior or equal colleague to followers.  He or she is apt to listen 
to people’s needs and opinions and accommodate more popular participation in decision-
making.  The leader not only leads public opinions, but also is responsive to citizens.  
Nevertheless, if the leader style is paternal-oriented, with which the leader behave like 
an authoritarian father or boss, even elected leaders tend to ignore citizens’ preferences 
and treat followers in a nonresponsive way.  
 
Leader style determines the style of a leadership relationship.  For example, a paternal 
leader results in a paternal leadership.  In this research, the analysis is focused on LCA 
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instead of actual leadership relations.  So the subject of interest is the style of a LCA 
relationship.8    
 
Leadership in Rural Communities: The Framework of Analysis 
  
Village communities in China 
As around 60% of the Chinese population live in rural communities,9 an in-depth 
examination of the role of leader-follower relations in the countryside is essential for a 
better understanding of Chinese politics.  We first need to know what a rural village is in 
China.  Currently there are approximately 700,000 villages in the country.  From a 2003 
national random sample,10 an average village is composed of 1436 individual persons as 
well as 392 households.  Among those households, 57% of them were practicing full-
time farming.  The average net per capita income of the year is 1832 RMB yuan ($223 in 
the 2003 exchange ratio).  About 11% of the sample villages reported they owned at 
least one enterprise.  
 
                                                 
8 Strictly speaking, until the actual formation of a leader-follower relationship, a citizen-
elite dyad should not be called the follower and the leader.  As LCA is an antecedent to 
the leadership relationship, individuals engaged in a LCA relation are not necessarily 
leaders and follower; they are, putting in an accurate way, potential leaders and 
followers.  But in this research, for convenience, I label elites and masses who are 
involved in a LCA relationship as leaders and followers; the style of LCA as leadership 
style. 
9 See “China's Rural Population Expected to be under 25 Percent: Economist.” People’s 
Daily (Renmin Ribao), May 19, 2002. 
10 Data are from the 2003 Poverty and Development in Rural China Survey, conducted 
by the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, the Chinese Academy of Sciences.  
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According to the Chinese constitution, the village is not a level of the state 
administration, but a “mass self-governing organization.”  Yet in all sense the village 
acts as the lowest administrative unit in the rural part of China.  The village committee 
and party branch are responsible for almost all public issues in the locality: enforcing 
upper-level policy, collecting taxes, recruiting party members, making budget plans, 
organizing public construction projects, providing public services, mediating disputes 
among villagers, maintaining social order, and so forth.   
 
The governing body in the village is bifurcated: both the party branch and the village 
committee are in charge.  The village party branch is the grassroots cell of the 
Communist Party, usually composed of a branch secretary, a deputy secretary, and a 
couple of members in charge of organization and propaganda.  The village committee is 
supposed the self-governing body of the village, consisting of a chief, one or more 
associate chiefs, an accountant, and perhaps several more members in charge of issues 
like family planning and social order.  In practice, the distinction between the two 
“committees” is rather blurred.  During my field work, I found in all villages I visited the 
two committees were highly overlapped in personnel.  Usually the village chief assumed 
the deputy secretary in the party branch and other village committee members were also 
members of the party branch.    
 
Before the late of 1980s both the party branch and the village committee were appointed 
from above.  In 1987 the National Congress passed the trial version of the Organic Law 
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of Village Committee, which suggested promoting popular elections of the village 
committee members.  In 1998 the Organic Law became an official law, requiring all 
village committees must be popularly elected by village residents and the candidate 
nomination process must be open to all voters.  Since then in almost all villages peasants 
have been enfranchised to elect their village committee members.  In the meantime, the 
party branch members are still appointed by the upper-level party.11  And in an 
overwhelming majority of villages, the party secretary is till the “leadership core” and 
the elected village chief usually plays as the “second-in-command.”  
 
There is a collective ownership in the village.  All land and some production means are 
owned by the collective and allocated to each household.  Since 1990s villages began to 
run their own enterprises and other business.  Profits from those enterprises or business 
are legally owned by the collective and practically controlled by village cadres. 
 
The framework of analysis 
Studies of peasant villages have revealed that this type of community is essentially 
different from urban communities or from rural communities in industrialized societies.  
First, the village is largely a self-sufficient network of human relations, and the residents 
                                                 
11 In some places political experiments were conducted to subject the party branch to a 
certain form of popular vote.  For example, in some Shanxi villages, people tried a two 
ballot-system to select party branch members.  First, all villagers participated in a “vote 
of confidence” to single out candidates from all party members in the village.  Then the 
party members or the upper-level party selected branch members from those candidates 
who passed the vote of confidence (Li, 1999).  So far there is no sign that these 
experiments will become regular practices all over the country.   
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are dependent upon the village world.  Unlike in a city, where social functions, such as 
production, recreation, and religious communion, are undertaken by different 
occupational groups, in the village all major functions are provided by the same 
collective.  Each person is “dependent on the village for his status, his access to 
production, his share of the surplus, his social and personal security, his place in the 
world.”  Under such circumstances, the characteristics of the village community have a 
“tremendous predictive power for the individual’s behavior” (Greer, 1955:45; 44).   
 
In this self-contained social network, the leader-follower relationship may be embedded 
at the center, connecting each individual villagers and cadres physically or psychically.  
The formation and styles of these dyadic connections are substantially determined by 
political and economic features that determine the nature of village social networks.  
Comparing a village focusing on traditional farming with a village engaged extensively 
in international trade, we would see significantly different leadership relationship and 
styles.  Also comparing a village during the late Imperial period when the state seldom 
interfered in village issues with a village in the Maoist ear when the Communist state 
machine was trying to absorb every cell of the society into a gigantic leviathan, we 
would see different types of village leadership.  The association between contextual 
factors and leadership is not a new topic in the leadership literature, but very little 
studies understand this question from the perspective of the relational approach, that is, 
regarding leadership as a social relationship; even less address how contextual factors in 
peasant villages influence political leadership.  In Chapter III “Community 
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Characteristics and Leadership,” a detailed discussion of the relationship between village 
community and leadership is presented.     
    
Another important aspect that distinguishes Chinese villages from other types of 
community is villages in China are experiencing dramatic political and economic change, 
from a “system of solidarity” to a “system of interest.”  A system of solidarity is oriented 
towards egalitarian aims within a community (Pizzorno, 1966, cited in Negrelli, 
1992:202).  In such a community people share values, traditions, beliefs, and 
commitments to a common end.  Individual objectives are congruent with the common 
goal and individual initiatives to pursue self-interests are discouraged, if not prohibited.  
In contrast, a system of interest is based on divergent interests of actors.  People’s values 
and beliefs are diversified; the common end is replaced by multiple individual goals.  
Individuals are encouraged to pursue their particular interests.  Simply speaking, in the 
system of solidarity, “cooperation in the realization of a common end prevails;” in the 
system of interest, “competition between divergent interests prevails” (Panebianco, 
1988:18). 
 
Since late 1970s, the Chinese government’s been promoting free market economy in the 
countryside.  In the meantime, new structures of governance have been established.  
These reforms are pushing villages to transform from isolated traditional peasant 
communities to open industrialized communities.  What is the impact of this 
transformation on local mass-elite relations?  What is the role of leadership connections 
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in this process?  In the traditional community of solidarity, the cohesion between 
peasants and village cadres were achieved through shared values and the common goal.  
Their mutual influence on policy opinions and mutual trust were based on these cohesive 
connections.  As villages are in the transition to systems of interest, and as common 
values and ends tend to collapse, the traditional solidarity cannot glue the mass and elites 
together any more.  In such situation, I contend, leadership, as an informal social 
relationship, is an important resource through which to affect connections between 
villagers and cadres.  In two aspects I make further exploration.  
 
Chapter IV, “Leadership and Mass-Elite Linkage,” examines how leadership could 
affect the formation of agreement between citizen and cadre opinions.  As we’ve 
discussed, leadership is an interpersonal influence process without appealing to formal 
authority and coercion.  During the transition to more interest-based and pluralistic 
communities, this influence process plays as a significant role in molding mass-elite 
congruence in villages.  If a cadre is recognized by villagers as a leader, she can shape 
villagers’ opinions of policy issues through leadership relations.  This effect may even 
compete with congruence from formal institutions, for example, elections.  Chapter IV 
argues that controlling the impact of elections, leadership still matters in forming mass-
elite concordance.        
 
Another effect of leadership relations is how they influence villagers’ attitudes toward 
cadres, which is addressed in Chapter V, “Leadership and Political Trust.”  In a system 
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of solidarity, peasants trust their local rulers because they share values, beliefs, life 
experience, and strive for a common objective.  As the community is collapsing into a 
system of interest, what provide the sources of political trust?  Why villagers still trust 
those cadres when they do not share values and beliefs and their interests are in 
competition?  Existing studies summarized several sources of trust, such as 
government’s job performance, a culture of trust, and democratic elections.  Chapter V 
contends that after controlling those factors, leadership plays an important role in the 
formation of trust.  Local cadres who are involved in leadership relations with villagers 
are more likely to be perceived as trustworthy by villagers than non-leader cadres.  
Leadership has such an effect because as a social relationship, it is a high-quality 
relationship based on mutual trust, respect, and obligations between leaders and 
followers.   
 
As a summary, the analysis framework of this dissertation can be illustrated in Figure 
2.2. 
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Figure 2.2: The Framework of Analysis   
Community 
Context   
Leadership 
Relations   
Opinion 
Linkage   
Political 
Trust  
 
 
However, as we’ve already been aware of, currently we have no way to directly measure 
leadership relations.  Instead of dealing with the leader-follower relationship itself, this 
research focuses on one important aspect of the leadership formation process: LCA.  
Existing literature on the categorization theory has revealed that LCA affects leadership 
relation.  Does LCA have an impact on opinion linkage and political trust between 
general masses and political elites, as shown in the solid lines in figure 2.3?   
 
 
LCA
Figure 2.3: The Framework of Analysis (Revised)  
Community 
Context   
Leadership 
Relations   
Opinion 
Linkage   
Political 
Trust  
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In figure 2.3, those relations indicated as dashed lines cannot be tested empirically since 
we cannot measure leadership relations directly.  But we can test the associations 
illustrated as solid lines.  Are there any theoretical justifications for the connections 
between LCA and opinion linkage or trust?  LCA is an agreement between masses and 
officials regarding leadership.  This agreement or congruence can be very meaningful for 
other dimensions of mass-elite relations.  Scholars have found that dyadic agreement 
between a superior and a member is positively related to the quality of their relationship 
(Pulakos and Wexley, 1983).  Partners of an interpersonal dyad tend to be attracted to 
each other based on similarity of attitudes and beliefs (Sosik et al., 2004).  Their 
agreement regarding “the meaning of certain mutually experienced events and situations 
will co-vary with the quality of their dyadic interdependencies” (Graen and Schiemann, 
1978:206).  Furthermore, mass-elite congruence not only leads to a high quality of their 
relations, but also to certain political behavior.  “The degree of similarity has 
implications for such varied topics as resource allocation, policy implementation, norms 
of reciprocity and trust, conflict resolution, and political representation” (Jennings, 2003).  
 
Based on these studies, I believe it is reasonable to posit congruence on leadership 
expectation and supplies also result in a high-quality mass-elite relationship and certain 
political behavior.  For example, LCA may enhance the leader’s influence on the 
follower’s policy opinion, as well as facilitate the follower’s belief that the leader is 
trustworthy. 
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From the next chapter on, I am going to discuss detailed theoretical frameworks 
regarding leadership and community context, mass-elite opinion linkages, and political 
trust.  Empirical analysis follows each theoretical model.    
 
The time period of the study 
In a broad sense, this research addresses politics in Chinese villages from 1979 to 
present, which is usually termed as “the reform era.”  During these more than two 
decades, the Communist government has promoted extensive political and economic 
reform throughout the country.  The previous totalitarian system was substantially 
dismantled and the regime has been in transition to a more market-oriented and more 
open one.  In the countryside, the former collective-production communes were taken 
place by the household responsibility system.  The once omnipotent village party 
secretary has to accommodate and learn to cooperate with an elected village chief.  As 
more and more peasants are involved in market activities, less and less of them still stick 
to traditional cropping.  A huge proportion of rural labors move to cities for a better 
living.  All these changes have fundamentally reshuffled mass-elite relations in the 
countryside.  For a social scientist who is interested in social and political changes, this 
time period provide an unusual opportunity to examine one of the most fundamental and 
rapid changes in today’s world.   
 
The quantitative analyses in this research are mostly focused on two years: 1990 and 
1996, or changes between these two years.  These two years are selected, of course, due 
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partially to a practical reason: the survey data used in the analyses were collected in the 
two years.  Nevertheless, there is a more important reason.  That is, these two time 
points grasp a time period when a major shift in mass-elite relations in the countryside 
took place.  From 1980s to 1990s, the cadre-villager relations in the rural grassroots 
experienced a deteriorating process.  In 1980s, the communist central government 
initiated political and economic reforms in the countryside.  Villagers benefited from 
those reforms.  In that decade, there was a kind of “honeymoon” relationship between 
peasants and the local state.  However, in early 1990s, the center employed several 
radical industrialization programs with an intention of a rapid rural modernization.  For 
instance, since 1994 government encouraged all rural communities to establish their own 
township-and-village enterprises (Oi, 1999).  Most of those enterprises went bankrupted 
later and brought heavy debts to village communities.  In the meantime, government 
attempted to enforce a set of regulations and policy tasks in the countryside, including 
family planning, agricultural taxes, grain procurement, and so forth.  Those policies were 
very unpopular in the grassroots, which considerably undermined the relationship 
between local officials and villagers (see Bernstein and Lu, 2000; Lu, 1997).  As a result, 
the honeymoon between officials and villagers was drawn to an end in early 1990s and 
mass-elite connections became increasingly antagonistic in the middle of 1990s.  The 
two-year quantitative data cover information right before and after the transition of 
mass-elite relations.  This provides a favorable condition to systematically track changes 
in many dimensions and to study their relationships. 
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CHAPTER III 
COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS AND LEADERSHIP 
 
This chapter examines how the economic and political reforms in China reshape 
leadership relations in rural communities.  The last three decades have witnessed how 
the reform has changed the politico-economic landscape of the Chinese countryside.  
Market economy has more and more taken root in the rural area; many farmers shifted 
into cash cropping, making profits in free market.  Growth in non-farm employment, 
rural industry, and the migration of large amount of rural labors into urban area are 
playing key roles in the nation’s modernization.  Since 1987 the Communist government 
has taken considerable efforts to promote village self-government, at the center of which 
is the competitive elections of village administrators.  How these changes influence one 
of the most important informal social relations in the village community, leadership? 
 
It is not new in the leadership literature that contextual factors have substantial impacts 
on the relationship between the leader and the follower.  This chapter focuses on one 
type of contextual factors, the modes of governance in communities, to address the 
association between social change and leadership change.  Empirical findings shall 
reveal that after controlling other factors of significance, the changing governance 
modes towards market economy and bureaucratic control have an important impact on 
the emergence of leader-follower relationship and a certain type of leadership, fraternal 
leadership.   
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Context and Leadership 
 
Recent development in leadership theory suggests that leadership is an “emerging social 
process produced by the interaction of a variety of factors, including context, tasks, 
group histories, and the personal qualities of leaders and followers” (Lord, et al., 
2001:312).  The effects of context have received considerable attention in the academics.  
As Perrow pointed out more than 30 years ago, “leadership style is a dependent variable 
which depends on something else.  The setting or task is the independent variable” 
(1970:6).  Researchers have explored the relationship between leadership and contextual 
factors.  Those contextual factors include characteristics of small groups and their task as 
micro-level contingency factors (identified by earlier contingency theorists), and 
characteristics of social systems or national culture at macro level (identified by more 
recent studies).  For instance, Shamir and Howell (1999) contended that micro-level 
contextual variables such as organizational tasks, goals, and structure affect the 
emergence and effectiveness of charismatic leadership.  “Charismatic leadership is more 
likely to emerge and be effective in dynamic environments that require and enable the 
introduction of new strategies, markets, products and technologies” (1999:9).  At the 
macro level, Jung and Avolio (1999) indicated that people from Eastern cultures are 
more responsive to transformational leadership than people from Western cultures.  
 
At the organizational level, Katz found that in a hierarchically structured organization 
(i.e., a political party or bureaucracy), different levels require different leadership 
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orientations and behavior (1973:211-15).  Harmel and Svasand (1993) advanced this 
argument in their research on political parties.  They revealed that different leadership 
needs exist at different stages of party development.  Leaders who lack the required 
skills and/or orientations for a certain stage tend to be replaced or complemented by 
others in order to avoid organizational failure and eventual collapse.  
 
A common theme of these researches is that by learning about the context in which 
leadership is occurring, we can understand the nature of the leadership.  The 
environmental context provides demands, constraints, and choices for leaders and 
followers (Panebianco, 1988; Hermann, 1986).  Eventually, differences in environmental 
background lead to different types of leader or leadership behavior.  The contextual 
approach is especially important in studying political leadership in social transformation.  
By examining the connection between contextual factors and leadership, we can explore 
the process how economic and political transitions remold the informal personal 
interactions between the leader and the led.  In China, a nice starting point for this 
research is to examine where the state meets the society: rural communities.  
Unfortunately, while there are a few studies dealing with community leadership (e.g. 
Presthus, 1964; Dahl, 1961), leadership in rural communities has been largely left out.  
Differing from settings such as small work groups, industrial organizations, and national 
culture, what are important contextual factors in a rural community, and how do those 
factors influence leader-follower interactions?  As a step toward addressing these 
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questions, in the subsequent sections, I provide a framework to conceptualize rural 
community environment and leadership as well as empirical analysis. 
 
Conceptualizing the Changing Context of Village Communities 
 
As we’ve discussed in the previous chapter, in this research we study Leadership 
Category Agreement as a surrogate of leadership relation.  If a target official matches a 
citizen’s prototypes, that official is likely to be viewed as a leader and rated accordingly.   
 
Recent work on leadership categorization has revealed that the cognitive structure of 
prototypes is not steadfast; on the contrary, it is largely a function of the changing 
environment.  Lord and Smith (1999) found that both followers’ leadership prototypes 
and leaders’ behaviors are products of a larger system of factors.  “Social system factors 
activate relevant perceptual constructs in followers, and relevant behavioral tendencies 
in leaders, and through this process, embed leadership in a flexible task and social 
system” (Lord et al., 2001:312).  Leadership prototypes may be generated as a response 
to or adjusted to various requirements of different contexts, tasks, structure, or culture of 
a group, organization or community.  Lord and Maher (1991) found that a perceiver’s 
evaluation of a prototype in a given situation may be moderated by what requirements a 
task type imposes on the leader.  Analyzing categorization as a process that neuron-like 
units “integrate information from input sources and pass on the resulting activation to 
connected (output) units” (2001:314), Lord and his colleagues indicated that if the 
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external situation is a crisis, the perceiver’s internal nodes associated with crisis 
managing are likely to be activated.  On the contrary, if the external situation is a routine 
task, internal nodes associated with daily operation are likely to be activated.  Thus, 
being in different contexts may create substantially different leadership expectations and 
perceptions. 
 
In short, LCA is formed from the congruence or match between the behavior of a target 
person and a prototype.  And prototypes are influenced by contextual factors.  A target 
individual who is apt to flexibly adapt his or her behavior to the demands of different 
situations will more likely be viewed as a leader.  In this research, I am interested in 
studying how changing contextual factors in rural communities influence LCA, and thus 
the emergence of leadership relations.  What kinds of factors matter in a village 
community? 
 
As we are studying the impact of political economic transformation on community 
leadership, we focus on one important aspect of community context: the predominant 
mode of governance or control in the community.  Three methods of governance are 
identified in literature: market, bureaucracy, and clan (Ouchi, 1980).  Shamir and Howell 
summarized the definitions of the three modes as follows (1999:270): 
 
In the market mode of governance, activities are regulated by market or price 
mechanisms… In the bureaucratic mode of governance, control and coordination 
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depend on rules, policies, hierarchy of authority, standardization, written 
communication, and other mechanisms to standardize behavior and assess 
performance… The third mode of governance, clan control, involves the use of 
shared values, traditions, beliefs, and commitments to control behavior…  When 
members’ activities are guided by the same values and beliefs they are more likely 
to cooperate with each other, coordinate their mutual activities, trust each other, 
and demonstrate commitment to the organization. 
 
As Pawar and Eastman point out, these modes of governance are not structural 
arrangements of an organization or community (1997:96).  While structural 
arrangements focus on formal roles, responsibilities, and communicative mechanisms of 
group members, modes of governance emphasize a set of values shared by members.  
Those values are important because they determine an individual’s preferred outcomes 
and means of action and thus, they are internalized, deep-in-mind driving forces of 
people’s behavior.  These driving forces may influence individual’s leadership 
prototypes or categorization behavior.  For instance, scholars have suggested that 
transformational or charismatic leadership is more likely to emerge in organizations with 
a clan mode of governance than with other modes of governance (Shamir and Howell, 
1999; Pawar and Eastman, 1997) 
   
In the Chinese villages in the past 30 years, changes have taken places in two 
dimensions.  The first dimension of change is from a clan mode to a market mode of 
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governance.  Villages have been getting more and more open to outside social and 
economic resources, and more and more involved in market activities.  The other 
dimension of change is from a clan mode of governance to a bureaucratic mode of 
governance.  Villages have been more and more incorporated into a national 
bureaucratic system, and village issues have been more and more interfered by the state.  
Transformations in these two dimensions is not only restructuring the market-
community and state-community relations, but also reshaping village residents’ values 
about their preferred political economic outcomes and ways of action, and thus 
leadership relations in the countryside. 
  
From clan mode to market mode of governance   
Governance in a traditional village can be characterized as a clan form.  According to 
Ouchi, “clan” here is referring to an association which “resembles a kin network but may 
not include blood relations” (1980:132).  In a community with a clan culture, individual 
objectives are congruent with collective goals.  Individual initiatives to pursue self-
interests are discouraged, if not prohibited.  The sense of community is so strong that 
individuals have no much autonomy in determining one’s own preferred outcomes or 
behavior modes.  Disciplines within the community are not achieved through contractual 
legal system or surveillance, but through the prevalent belief that personal interested are 
best served by pursuing the interests of the whole community (Kanter, 1972:41).  This 
type of community can also be termed as Max Weber’s closed corporate community.12  
                                                 
12 Max Weber defines a social relationship as “open” to outsiders “if and in so far as 
 48
 
In a closed community with clan style governance, peasants practice intensive planting 
and cropping with traditional technology based on manual labor.  Production is largely 
isolated from fluid capital and outside market (Wolf, 1955:456, 457).  Collective 
property rights are the more popular form of property rights in the community.  
Members are made co-owners of village land and other important production resources, 
which makes the community looks like a corporation (Appell, 1983; Wolf, 1955:457).  
In addition, there are a set of internal institutionalized norms and mores and a norm-
enforcing group of elites (Dow, 1973:905).  
 
In villages, local elites’ primary duty is to defend local culture, values, and norms.   
Defense of this culture maintains the solidarity and stability of such communities.  They 
usually behave like benign patriarchies, ruling the village like a father taking care of his 
family.  So village heads are rarely outsiders of the community.  While their 
appointments may need to get approval by the state, their positions are mostly internally 
created.   Since both elites and villagers share values and objectives in such a 
                                                                                                                                                
participation in the mutually oriented social action relevant to its subjective meaning 
is…not denied to anyone who wishes to participate and who is actually in a position to 
do so.” A closed relationship is “according to its subjective meaning and the binding 
rules of its order, participation of certain persons is excluded, limited or subjected to 
conditions” (1947:127). In the Chinese countryside, the story is going along another 
direction: a social relationship is open if participants of the relationship are not denied to 
involve social activities outside the relationship.  The concept of closed corporate 
community is defined as “social relationship which is either closed or limits the 
admission of outsiders by rules, will be called a ‘corporate group’ so far as its order is 
enforced by the action of specific individuals whose regular function is of a chief or head 
and usually also an administrative staff” (1947:133). 
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homogeneous community, it is reasonable to posit it is relatively easy for local heads 
behavior to match villagers’ leadership prototypes.  That is, leadership emerges more 
likely than other types of communities.   
 
Villages with a market mode of governance are quite different.  Cooperation among 
community members are not achieved through shared values, but through transactions in 
the market place.  “The transaction takes place between the two parties and is mediated 
by a price mechanism in which the existence of a competitive market reassures both 
parties that the terms of exchange are equitable” (Ouchi, 1980:130).  There are no 
congruence between individual goals and collective objectives anymore.  Members are 
substantially independent of the community.  They determine their own life style and 
means to achieve it.  They are encouraged to pursue self-interests, making profits with 
their own labors.  Individual initiatives in business and entrepreneurship are highly 
praised and respected.     
 
In compared with a closed corporate community, the second type of village is an open 
community.  Peasants practice cash cropping to meet demands of the outside market. 
They may receive external resources to invest on the production, which makes them 
remain interested in the outside world and tie their fortunes to exterior needs.   Although 
there may be still collective property rights, individual efforts to accumulate wealth are 
permitted or even encouraged.  Local values and moral norms in this type of community 
 50
are relatively diverse and less important than that in corporate villages in maintaining the 
solidarity of the community (Wolf, 1955; Skinner, 1971).  
 
Not surprisingly, elites in the open community are not so much defenders of local culture 
as those in clan form of control.  They are expected to act as communicators between the 
localities and the external world.  Although leaders lose the authority to review and 
revise individual decisions as their counterparts do in closed communities, they 
reestablish their authority through bringing exterior information and resources and 
promoting local produce and products in the world market.  To do this, they need to have 
knowledge and skills to communicate with outside world and guide people make fortune, 
which usually means more open-minded and more entrepreneurial abilities.   
 
In the village with a market mode of governance, if both elites and masses are fully 
involved in market activities and are equally entrepreneurial-oriented, there is a pretty 
high chance of the match between villagers’ leadership categories and the target elite’s 
behavior.  However, if the village is during the course of transition from the clan mode 
to market mode, then values and views about market transaction must be very 
heterogeneous.  Some people are more open-minded and want to pursue personal 
interests while others may still prefer the old fashioned community life.  Under such 
situation, it is difficult for a village head to be extensively perceived as a leader by her 
fellow villagers. 
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From clan mode to bureaucratic mode of governance   
Villages with a clan mode of governance can also be characterized as communities with 
weak state penetration.  Researchers of peasant communities have revealed that the 
transformation from a traditional community to a modern one is a process of increasing 
interference from the state.  In the traditional, corporate-like villages, internal issues are 
largely handled within the community.  The only time peasants come in direct contact 
with the state is when taxes have to be paid or when a serious crime is committed in the 
village (Yang, 1945).  The village polity protects its interest against neighboring villages 
and other outsiders, maintains its internal peace and security, and prevents the state’s 
overexploitation (Befu, 1967:612).  The clan form of governance is essentially self-
governance of the village, making the village independent from the national bureaucratic 
system. 
 
Governing officials in the village with weak state penetration are usually selected by 
their communities rather than appointed by the state.  Their legitimacy is largely based 
on community tradition, culture, and norms, not on the authorization of the state (Weber, 
1968).  The bureaucratic hierarchy of the state ceases at some level above the village.  
The state has to rely on the traditional and indigenous power structure of the village in 
articulating itself (Li, 2003).  Therefore, when village heads have to encounter the state, 
they behave like a representative of the locality, instead of an agent from above. 
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In contrast, in villages with a bureaucratic mode of governance, the cooperation of 
members depends on “a social agreement that the bureaucratic hierarchy has the 
legitimate authority to provide this mediation” (Ouchi, 1980:130).  The village must be 
part of the bureaucratic hierarchy.  Surveillance is conducted through formalized 
monitoring and specified contract by the state apparatus.  That is why the modern state 
always attempts to bring village community into the national fold through land reforms, 
development programs, public health, or personnel appointment.  The government 
begins to affect more and more areas of life, gradually replacing the traditional political 
structure of the village with a structure of bureaucracy.  As governmental officials 
exercise more and more power in village life, the local autonomy is gradually enfeebled 
(Befu, 1967:615-618).  The village community thus becomes incorporated into the 
bureaucratic structure of the national government.  As a result, the state is no longer 
satisfied with giving approval to the villagers’ selection of their heads.  It now attempts 
to impose a whole set of political offices on villages and change community officials 
into local state agents, whose offices are extensions of the state bureaucracy and legal 
system, and whose recruitment to the offices are decided by the state (Befu, 1967:616).   
 
For village elites, when they are internally selected within communities, and when they 
behave autonomously from the state machine under the clan mode of governance, they 
are more likely to share values or views with their villagers.  When village officials are 
appointed and sent by the state government, and behave as a branch of the national 
bureaucracy, they don’t have to pay attention to villagers’ values or views.  They only 
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need to follow the instructions of their superiors within the bureaucratic system.  Hence 
it is reasonable to posit that elites in the clan mode of control more likely emerge as 
leaders than those local bureaucrats. 
 
Changing Village Communities in China 
 
From clan mode to market mode of governance   
The past three decades have witnessed the Chinese villages being transformed from clan 
form of control to market form of control.  During Maoist period, rural communities 
were organized into the People’s Commune system through collectivization movement.  
A commune (which is equivalent to today’s town or township) was composed of 
production teams (equivalent to today’s natural village or small group) in which all 
peasants were members.  An extreme type of collective property rights existed in the 
commune.  All land, machines, stools, utilities, and livestock were collective owned.  
The production team was not only the basic unit of accounting and production, but also 
the community administration in charge of almost all spheres of peasant life, such as 
public services, education, healthcare, social security, military training, and so forth (Oi, 
1989).  According to Vivian Shue, the commune system demonstrated a pattern of 
“honeycomb,” which was highly localized, self-sufficient, particularized, and cell-like 
(1988).  This is a strong version of closed corporate community with a clan mode of 
governance. 
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The marketized reform after 1979 provides peasants with a way out from the closed 
corporate village within the commune system (Oi, 1989:226).  Rapid expansion of 
market relations in economy, society, and the very work of local government have 
shaken both the closed corporate structure and the morality of localism.  Although the 
collective still remains ownership of major means of production—land, factories, and 
large equipment, the basic farming unit is now the peasant household, which undermined 
the corporate nature of the village community as a central unit of social life (Oi, 
1990:16).  Peasants are being reorganized into collective business or individual 
producers that operate for profit and deal with all outside suppliers and customers.  
Village cultures are becoming less socially homogenous, and therefore less solidarity as 
in the clan form of governance.  Villagers are more and more divided by divergent 
interests (Shue, 1988:148).  
 
As the cell-like communities were being substituted by new web-like ones (as they 
following the “natural” networks of commercial exchange between city and countryside), 
the demands for leadership have been in change.  While leaders are not in charge of the 
ultimate decision for production, sales, and distribution, they are expected to act as an 
even more crucial role in local economic development (Oi, 1992; Lin, 1995; Nee, 1992; 
Walder, 1996).  Cash cropping and industrial business urged local cadres and villagers to 
look beyond the local boundaries for opportunities and interests.  Rural leaders must be 
very aggressive now seeking resources such as labors, materials, finance, and markets 
(Lin, 1995:344; Shue, 1988:148-49). 
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From clan mode to bureaucratic mode of governance   
Conventional wisdom believes that the Chinese villages had already been successfully 
incorporated into a totalitarian state which controls practically every sphere of peasant 
life (e.g., Befu, 1967:617).  If this is true, then the state penetration in the Chinese 
villages has remained strong since the Maoist revolution succeeded in 1949.  But some 
scholars challenged this idea, arguing that even in the Maoist era, state power had been 
weakened and compromised by the forces of localism or the clan form of control.   Local 
cadres often acted as much the state agent as the protector of their communities against 
upper level penetration.  Actually, it is the post-Mao reform, through rapid expansion of 
market relations that is shaking the structure of local autonomy under the clan mode of 
governance, that made the state power more efficiently extend to the grassroots (Shue, 
1988).  If this argument is supported, then the reform process in the past 20 years is one 
from weak state penetration to strong state penetration.  
 
I argue for the latter point of view.  I believe that the Maoist revolution failed to 
integrate the rural China into a modern state, leaving a lot of pre-modern elements in the 
political and economic structure of villages.  First, kinship is politically salient.  
Although before the reform lineage groups seemed disappeared under the totalitarian 
control, they have recovered very rapidly and played an important role (as what they did 
before the revolution) in local governance (Tsai, 2001).  It turns out that their influence 
was just temporarily suppressed.  It is increased mobility of rural labors stimulated by 
the marketized transformation that separates kinsmen from one another geographically 
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as well as socially.  Second, communal ownership of subsistence resources, which 
extensively existed in imperial China and all other traditional societies, was not 
weakened but crystallized by the people’s commune system.  It is the post-Mao reform 
that has assigned individual peasant households partial ownership over some production 
means (Oi, 1990).  Finally, the Maoist village was economically self-sufficient and 
culturally isolated and parochial.  It is the market economy and rapid industrialization 
that create an exchange system of much wider scope based on interdependence between 
villages and cities and between regions.  Apparently, under the Maoist state, the 
commune and production teams were parts of the state apparatus, and commune and 
team officials were supposed to be loyal to their superiors in the bureaucracy.  However, 
the survival of above pre-modern socioeconomic structures “become a maze of power 
pockets and vested interests manned by people who were constrained to mouth the 
rhetoric of revolution but who often had everything to gain by protecting and elaborating 
on the status quo.  These stubborn, savvy, and often cynical local officials came to 
constitute a formidable obstacle to real and effective central penetration and control on 
the ground” (Shue, 1988:130, 131). 
 
Two changes in the Deng reform have facilitated the government to penetrate into the 
village and influence its internal activities.  The first is the breakdown of localist village 
polity resulting from the extinct of the commune system and the formation of wide-scale 
economic interdependence.  With the onslaught of urbanization and industrialization, 
self-sufficient natural economy was being swept away and replaced by multiple interest 
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groups and secondary groupings based on occupations, vocations, and other voluntary 
organizations (Lin, 1995:344).  As the entrenched power pockets were broken down, the 
local cell-wall boundaries have become rather porous and weak in faced with state 
penetration strengthened by continuous economic growth and more advanced public 
policy leverages (Shue, 1988:131-132). 
 
Another change that has promoted state penetration is that the party-state has been 
successful in transforming its political control from direct command to a state corporatist 
style.  According to the literature of “local corporatism” (Oi, 1989; Walder, 1990; Nee, 
1992), I contend that because of market-oriented reforms, the Leninist local state has 
moved towards a mixed form of governance appropriate to an industrial economy 
consisting of both private and collectively owned businesses.   There are three 
characteristics of this corporatist governance.  First, it encourages private efforts in both 
industrial and profitable agricultural business.  Second, the local government remains 
control in critical political and economic resources, such as, licensing, land use permit, 
personnel appointment in villages and business associations, etc., in order to constrain 
the marketized sector from being independent (Oi, 1999).  Third, the state keeps its 
resource-extracting capability through imposing a set of regulations on rural 
communities, such as tax, informal charges, and grain procurement (Lu, 1997; Bernstein 
and Lu, 2000). 
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Thus, the penetration of the party-state into peasant communities has been enhanced 
during the reform from a command system to a state corporatist system.  During this 
process, the local party branch plays a central role.  Although there are widespread 
reports of difficulties in new member recruitment in rural areas (Baum and Shevchenko, 
1999:343), although the majority of villages have held popular elections for the village 
committee since 1987, in my field interviews in 2003 and 2004, I still found that in 11 
out of 12 villages, it was the party branch acts as the leadership core and the elected 
village committee is at most an executive assistant.  A major strategy employed by the 
party branch to control the village administration is personnel interlocking, that is, the 
overlapping of party personnel and village administrative staff. 
 
Empirical Analysis and Findings  
 
Based on the above discussion, we can examine empirically how the changes going 
along in the Chinese village communities influence LCA, and hence the occurrence and 
style of leadership.   
 
The dependent variable, LCA, is measured on the basis of the leadership categorization 
theory.  As we’ve known, LCA increases the likelihood of leadership relation; and it is a 
function of community context.  In the four-county survey, the mass respondents were 
asked a multiple-choice question, “what kind of person you think a leading cadre ought 
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to be.”13  Each respondent made choices among eight roles: patriarch, friend, teacher, 
pupil, protector, mediator, vanguard, and representative of interests.14  These items are 
used as measures of leadership prototypes of the mass respondents. 
 
Ideally, we should have information of the mass perception of their local officials’ 
behavior or opinions, to see if these perceptions match their leadership prototypes.   In 
the absence of such information, I use cadres’ views of their own leading roles as a 
proxy.  For elite respondents, they were ask “how do you see your relations with the 
people” and also selected answers among the same eight categories as those in the 
villager questionnaire.15  For each villager-cadre dyad, a leadership score is created by 
calculating to what extent the leader categories identified by the cadre in that village 
match those selected by the villager.  The basic logic is shown in the following diagram: 
 
 
                                                 
13 The codebook for the 1990 Four-County Study of Chinese Local Government and 
Political Economy survey is available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu. The codebook for 
the 1996 study has yet to be publicized.   The items referred to here are M3020 through 
M3027 in 1990 and M3010 in 1996. 
14 In 1990, each respondent selected three out of the eight roles; in 1996 each of them 
selected one out of the eight roles.   
15 The items referred to here are C5040 through C5047 in 1990 and C5030 in 1996.  In 
1990, each respondent selected three out of the eight roles; in 1996 each of them selected 
one out of the eight roles. 
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Village cadres’ views of their own leading roles
Villagers’ prototypes of leading roles 
Match Not match LCA No LCA 
Figure 3.1: Measuring Leadership Category Agreement 
 
 
 
To have a LCA score comparable across 1990 and 1996, we first create a leader style 
score for both elites and masses.  In the previous chapter two types of leader style are 
defined: paternal and fraternal leaders.  Each of the eight roles identified by village 
cadres and villagers is coded as one of the two values: patriarch, teacher, protector, and 
vanguard are assumed to be paternal-oriented and coded as “-1;” whereas, friend, pupil, 
mediator, and representative of interests are assumed to be fraternal leader styles and 
coded as “1.”  In the 1996 data, we recode the “-1” into “0” in order to get a dummy 
variable.  In the 1990 data, since each respondent selected three categories, for each 
respondent, these values are added up and the sum is divided by 3.  Then the results are 
dichotomized into a dummy variable with values no less than zero as “1” and values 
smaller than zero as “0.”  Through this procedure we obtain a leader style score.  For 
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village officials, the score refers to their self-identified leader style; for village residents, 
it refers to how they perceive the leader style of their local cadres.  The larger the score, 
the more fraternal the leader style is. 
 
Now we can measure how much mass respondents match their cadres in terms of leader 
style score.  A dummy variable of LCA is generated.  The variable is valued “1” if a 
villager’s leader style score equals the one of the correspondent village head and valued 
“0” if otherwise.  For instance, if both a villager and her village head are scored a 
paternal leader style, we say there is a match between a mass respondent’s leadership 
prototypes and a cadre’s self-perceived leading roles, and then the cadre is likely to be 
perceived as a leader by that mass respondent.  If there is a non-zero score between an 
elite and a citizen, then we know there is a LCA relation existing between the two.  If the 
score is zero, there is not a leadership linkage between the elite and the citizen. 
 
We are not only interested in the determinants of LCA or leadership relations, also 
interested in what factors contribute to a certain style of leadership, say, fraternal 
leadership.  So another dependent variable is created, fraternal LCA.  This is the product 
of leader style score and LCA, where “1” a fraternal leadership and “0” means other 
situations.   
 
In the analysis, both dependent variables are aggregated at the village level by 
calculating the ratio of the number of “1” to total non-missing values in a village, that is, 
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the percentage of mass-elite dyads in each village involved in LCA relations or fraternal 
leadership relations.  Table 3.1 reports the distribution of LCA relations in 1990 and 
1996. 
 
 
Table 3.1: The Distribution of LCA and Fraternal-Styled LCA 
 
 Obs Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
1996 LCA  57 .4949231 .2760691 .0555556 1 
1990 LCA 58 .5521381 .2679144 .0588235 .9375 
      
1996 Fraternal 
LCA 
57 .0997848 .1225478 0 .3636364 
1990 Fraternal 
LCA 
58 .1040015 .159397 0 .6153846 
 
 
We expect that during the transition from the clan mode to the market mode of 
governance, the homogeneity of village residents’ market orientations is positively 
related to emergence of leadership relations.  If both elites and ordinary residents are 
involved in market activities and both are driven by individual initiatives to pursue 
prosperity, it is not difficult for them to share values or preferences.  Thus village 
officials are likely to be viewed as leaders by their fellow villagers.  If, however, the 
market orientations in the village are very heterogeneous, some are involved in business 
in the free market a lot while others are still in the traditional farming, then values and 
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preferences in the village are very diverse.  Villagers’ leadership prototypes tend to 
become heterogeneous accordingly.  As a result, cadres less likely emerge as leaders 
than those cadres in a homogenous community.    
 
On the other hand, we expect the homogeneity of market orientations is negatively 
related to the formation of fraternal leadership.  In a closed corporate community, village 
heads are protectors of local values and usually rule like an authoritative father in an 
extended family.  So their leader style is mostly paternal.  In a completely open 
community with a dominant market mode of control, village cadres are usually in charge 
of village enterprises and taking a leadership role in soliciting investment, fiscal 
management, and marketing.  As Oi points out (1996), they control most crucial 
economic resources in the village.  So they can also rule in an authoritative and arbitrary 
way.  Only in a village during the transitional process from a closed to open one, when 
the traditional patriarchy is declining and the new governance based on economic 
dominance is still under construction, leaders are the least likely to be authoritative and 
paternal.  In such a village with heterogeneous values and preferences, leaders do not 
have an authority base either from traditional values or from the control of economic 
resources.  Simply speaking, in a transitional and thus heterogeneous village, leaders 
have no enough resources to be paternal.   
  
Two variables are used to measure the change in market orientations of village 
communities in the reform era.  Individual initiative, which is the ratio of two scales: 
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importance of individual initiative to get rich and importance of government 
management of economy to bring about prosperity.16  The larger the ratio, the more the 
respondent is individualistic-oriented and believes the locus of responsibility for 
personal well-being lies in individual rather than the state or other collectives.  This is a 
value prevalent in a marketized society.  The second measure is entrepreneurship, which 
is whether the respondent is willing to spend most of their money to start a business if 
necessary.17  In a traditional community where most people practice cropping or 
husbandry, people would not be interested in investing in a business with the intention of 
making profits in the free market.  Only when the community is involved in activities in 
market, then people begin to develop their entrepreneurship.  For each village I calculate 
the standard deviation of the variables.  Large values of these two indicate a high level of 
heterogeneity in market orientations.  I anticipate higher levels of heterogeneity are 
associated with lower occurrence of LCA and higher chance of fraternal leadership style.   
 
The third variable to measure community characteristics is whether the village is in the 
clan mode or bureaucratic mode of governance, aka., the state-community relations.  In a 
traditional community the state has very limited capacity to regulate its public issues.  
Ordinary residents would feel very little about the role of the state.  Whereas, when a 
village is incorporated into a national bureaucratic system, governmental role will 
become much more notable and draw more attention from villagers.  Here I 
                                                 
16 In the 1990 data the items are M5022 and M5020; in 1996 the items are M5011 and 
M5012. 
17 In the 1990 data the item is M5001; in 1996 it is M5001. 
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operationalize it as how much attention the villagers paid to government.18  The 
assumption is that the more the state penetrates into village affairs, the more the 
residents think about government in their daily life.  For each village I calculate the 
mean values of this measure.  The more attention to government, the more state 
penetration, thus the more likely that a cadre behaves as state agent and in an 
authoritarian way. 
 
In the analysis I use the change of these three variables from 1990 to 1996, i.e., 
subtracting the values in 1990 from those in 1996.  The aim is to examine how the 
changes in market orientations and state penetration influence the formation of 
leadership and leadership style during the course of 1990 to 1996.  Based on the above 
discussion, we have the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Increase in the standard deviation of individual initiative is 
negatively related to increase in LCA. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Increase in the standard deviation of individual initiative is 
positively related to increase in fraternal-style LCA. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Increase in the standard deviation of entrepreneurship is negatively 
related to increase in LCA. 
                                                 
18 In the 1990 data the item is M3050; in 1996 it is M3040. 
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Hypothesis 2a: Increase in the standard deviation of entrepreneurship is positively 
related to increase in fraternal-style LCA. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Increase in attention to government is negatively related to increase 
in LCA. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Increase in attention to government is positively related to increase 
in fraternal-style LCA. 
 
In addition to the three explanatory variables, we also need to track the socioeconomic 
change in the communities.  So in the model I include the change in average family 
income and average education levels of villagers from 1990 to1996.  Moreover, three 
other village level factors are controlled.  The first one is kinship relations in village 
communities.  Studies by Putnam (1993) and Levi (1996) have linked informal social 
networks to social trust and mass-elite connections.  Scholars of the Chinese rural 
politics found that kinship networks are important resources for political competitions.  
For instance, Xiao (2001) revealed that most villagers vote for their own lineage and 
candidates from large lineages have a higher chance of winning offices in village 
elections.  Tsai (2002) found that in multiple-surname villages the mass-elite relations 
tend to be conflicting.  Further, Kennedy (2002) discovered that in villagers in villages 
with two or three large lineages are least satisfied with village elections.  Since kinship 
relations have an influence on the interactions between ordinary citizens and local 
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officials, we need to control their effects.  Following Manion (2006), I use surname 
diversity to measure lineage relations.  It is computed from a random sample of 
surnames in the village.19  Lower values represent greater surname concentration and 
higher values reflect greater surname diversity.  There are data for 57 villages.  Among 
all these 57, there are no single-surname villages.  Small values of surname diversity 
suggest a few major lineages competing for power in a village, and thus strong 
influences in politics; whereas, large values suggest a high level of lineage fragmentation 
and a low level of influences on politics.  As multiple surnames increase competition 
among cadres and conflicts between officials and villagers, we anticipate that this 
variable is negatively related to the emergence of LCA.  In addition, a fragmented 
lineage structure decreases the chance that a certain leader is from a large lineage, thus 
decreases the political resources that the leader is able to employ to support his or her 
authority.  So we expect there is a positive relationship between surname diversity and 
fraternal leadership.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Surname diversity is negatively related to increase in LCA. 
 
Hypothesis 4a: Surname diversity is positively related to increase in fraternal-style 
LCA. 
 
                                                 
19 For detailed coding of this variable, please see Manion, 2006:312-13. 
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Another important village level factor that could influence the formation of leadership 
relations is village elections.  Competitive elections can affect leadership relations in two 
aspects.  First, voters tend to elect those who are “similar” to them (Erikson, 1978:526).  
People prefer candidates who share their policy opinions, political attitudes, or 
personality.  This suggests that people would also like to elect a leader, one whose 
behavior matches their leadership prototypes.  Second, once a politician is in office, to 
maintain the position or to win over next election, the politician is likely to align his or 
her own opinions and behavior with what the constituency prefers, and thus produces 
agreement between officials and general voters (Verba and Nie, 1972).  This may 
include adjusting an official’s behavior to match voters’ leadership categories.  With 
these two aspects, we predict that contesting elections have a positive relationship with 
the formation of leader-follower agreement.  The more competitive the election is, the 
more likely to find a LCA between the elected and the voters.  In addition, elections also 
increase the likelihood of fraternal leadership.  Electoral democracy promotes 
responsiveness of elected officials.  The prospects of reelection plays as a monitoring 
mechanism, which pushes officials respect voters, listen to public demands and opinions.  
With this mechanism elected elite can hardly lead in an authoritarian style or like an 
arbitrary father.  So we expect the levels of contestation have a positive relationship with 
the likelihood of fraternal style leadership.  In the analysis, levels of electoral 
competitiveness are measured as the mean of the ratio of the number of candidates to that 
of positions on the village committee in elections from 1990 to 1996.20
                                                 
20 For detailed coding of this variable, please see Manion, 2006. 
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Hypothesis 5: Electoral competitiveness is positively related to increase in LCA. 
 
Hypothesis 5a: Electoral competitiveness is positively related to increase in 
fraternal-style LCA. 
 
Finally, the population size of villages is also controlled.  As leadership is an 
interpersonal influence process, the larger the size of a community, the more difficult the 
members in that community develop a leader-follower relation with the community 
officials.  So the expected relationship between population size and LCA or fraternal 
leadership is negative.  In the analysis, the village population in 1990 is used.  
 
Hypothesis 6: Village population size is negatively related to increase in LCA. 
 
Hypothesis 6a: Village population size is negatively related to increase in 
fraternal-style LCA. 
 
Though in this research we are interested in how contextual factors affect leadership, we 
need to take into consideration individual characteristics of cadres.  According to our 
definition, LCA is a matching process between ordinary citizens and local officials.  If 
those village-level factors have an impact on the leader prototypes of citizens, we need 
also consider how officials’ individual characteristics influence their likelihood to match 
citizens.  First the village cadre’s family income and education levels are controlled.  
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These are measured as the difference of values between 1990 and 1996.  Also, 
corresponding to those community level factors, the cadre’s market orientations and 
relations with the state are included in the model.  The coding process of cadre 
entrepreneurial orientation and individual initiative is the same as village level variable 
with minor revision21.  We predict that the more market-oriented a cadre is, the less 
likely for her to emerge as a leader.  Cadres with strong entrepreneurial values are more 
aggressive in profit-making and usually they are richer than their fellow villagers in the 
locality.   The gap of income brings the inequality problem into mass-elite interactions.  
In addition, entrepreneurial cadres are usually running village enterprises or taking 
charge of economic management, which has provided them with great opportunities of 
rent-seeking.  Corruption has become a predominant problem in the Chinese grassroots 
since 1990s.  Combining these two together makes us believe that general villagers less 
likely to identify an entrepreneurial cadre as their leader.  Some analysis demonstrates 
preliminary evidence.22  For the second dependent variable, we posit a positive 
relationship between cadres’ market orientations and emergence of fraternal leadership.  
Entrepreneurial village heads are forerunners in the village in the sense that they are the 
ones introducing new ideas, views, or ways of life into the village.  They are usually 
                                                 
21 For individual initiative, the survey items are C3030, C031, and C3032 in 1990, and 
C3031 and C3032 in 1996. For entrepreneurship, the items are C3010 in 1990 and 1996.  
While for the village level variables, the standard deviation of each village is computed, 
for the cadre variable, the individual level values are used. 
22 In the 1996 data, there are slight, but significantly positive correlations between cadre 
entrepreneurship and villagers’ belief that “some people get more than their fair share” 
and “cadres and officials get more than their fair share,” and there is a slight, but 
significantly negative correlation between cadre entrepreneurship and mass villagers’ 
feeling thermometer of local elite.  In the 1990 data, there are no significant correlations 
found. 
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more amiable than ordinary villagers to the market mode of governance.  Unlike 
patriarchy and hierarchy in the clan mode and bureaucratic mode, transactions in the 
market take place between the relatively equal parties and are regulated by price 
mechanism.  Cadres involved considerably in market activities tend to treat other parts 
equally, and is inclined to consider others’ demands or preferences.  Once they become 
leaders, we expect they are more likely to treat their followers relatively equally, that is, 
in a fraternal style. 
 
Hypothesis 7: Increase in cadre individual initiative is negatively related to 
increase in LCA. 
 
Hypothesis 7a: Increase in cadre individual initiative is positively related to 
increase in fraternal-style LCA. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Increase in cadre entrepreneurship is negatively related to increase 
in LCA. 
 
Hypothesis 8a: Increase in cadre entrepreneurship is positively related to increase 
in fraternal-style LCA. 
 
For the cadre’s view of state-village relations, I employ the cadre’s assessment of his/her 
relations with upper-level officials.  In the Chinese system, the lowest level of the state 
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apparatus is township or town.  The village is legally not a part of the state, but a “mass 
self-governing organization.”  For village cadres, their upper-levels are officials in the 
township or county or even higher.  Village cadres’ relations with those upper-levels are 
one of the most important parts of their interactions with the state.  This survey item is a 
10-point scale starting from “harmonious” to “conflictual.”23  If a village official has a 
harmonious relationship with higher-level governments, this official is more likely to be 
a state agent than a representative of the locality.  As an “outsider” to the community, 
this person has smaller chance to be identified as a leader by her community fellow 
citizens.  In contrast, if the official often conflict with upper-levels, it is less likely for 
her to behave like a state agent than a protector of local interests.  Then she has more 
chance to form leader-follower relations with community members.  In short, we posit a 
positive relationship between conflicts with upper-level government and the 
establishment of LCA.  In addition, if the leader acts as a local representative, we may 
anticipate she tends to treat people in her neighborhood not as authoritarian as 
governmental bureaucrats.  She may behave more in a fraternal style.  So we predict 
village cadre’s conflict with government is positively related to fraternal leadership style.  
For these three variables of village cadre’s relations with market and the state, changes 
in these three factors are coded by subtracting 1990 values from those of 1996.   
 
Hypothesis 8: Increase in cadre conflict with government is positively related to 
increase in LCA. 
                                                 
23 In 1990 it is C2180 and in 1996 it is C2190. 
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Hypothesis 8a: Increase in cadre conflict with government is positively related to 
increase in fraternal-style LCA. 
       
We are interested in how the changes in these independent variables between 1990 and 
1996 influence changes in the two dependent variables in the same time period.  In the 
analysis, the two dependent variables are supposed to be coded by subtracting 1990 
values from those of 1996.  Since both variables are percentages contained between 0 
and 100, a logarithmic transformation is made to permit linear estimation of the two 
variables.24  Table 3.2 presents the results of OLS regressions of the models. 
 
The first model is the analysis of determinants of LCA.  The goodness of fit of the model 
is fairly acceptable with an R-square at .47.  Among the two indicators of market 
orientations, villagers’ entrepreneurship turns out to be significant.  As expected, after 
controlling other community characteristics and cadres’ individual characteristics, the 
heterogeneity of villagers’ entrepreneurship significantly decreases the likelihood of 
LCA.  This supports our argument that during the course of transformation from a clan 
form to a market form of control, the chance of forming leadership relations is on the 
decline.  We don’t find significant association between villagers’ attention to 
government and LCA.   
 
                                                 
24 The formula of the transformation is log[1996 fraction/(1-1996 fraction)]-[ 1990 
fraction/(1-1990 fraction)], where 1996 and 1990 fractions are percentages of villager-
cadre dyads that constitute a leader-follower relation or fraternal leadership relation in 
each village.  This formula is following the one used by Manion, 2006. 
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Among the village level control variables, surname diversity demonstrates significance 
and is negatively related to the formation of leadership, which is consistent with our 
expectation.  Political competitions based on multiple lineages do diminish the chance 
for cadres to be perceived as leaders.  Among the individual cadre factors, both 
individual initiative and entrepreneurship have a negative impact on LCA connections.  
This confirms that entrepreneurial-oriented village cadres are less likely to build up 
leadership with villagers.       
 
The second model is the analysis of what factors contribute to the formation of fraternal 
style leadership.  At the village level, as anticipated, the higher levels of heterogeneity of 
villagers produce higher percentage of fraternal leadership in that village.  This suggests 
the expectation is right: leaders in a transitional community are faced with more 
challenges than their counterparts in a more traditional or more marketized community; 
they do not have enough resources to be paternal.  Villagers’ attention to government, a 
proxy of state penetration, is negatively related to the possibility of fraternal leadership.  
Those who behave like a part of the state bureaucracy tend not to see themselves as 
members of the community, so they tend to treat villagers as their subjects, not their 
neighbors.  This provides clear evidence that state penetration into local communities 
pushes local leaders to behave more like authoritative state agents.   
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Table 3.2: Community and Individual Determinants of Village LCA 
 
 LCA Fraternal LCA 
Village Level Variables   
Individual Initiative  -.6241342 
(.5555274) 
2.876034* 
(1.871381) 
Entrepreneurship -7.36219**  
(3.375295) 
17.72397*  
(11.32925) 
Attention to Government .5156741 
(.9224864) 
-4.194351* 
(3.109257) 
Average Family Income .139931 
(.1632883) 
-.400595 
(.5492226) 
Average Education -.9224085*** 
(.3229734) 
2.701165*** 
(1.088487) 
Kinship Diversity -.1001449** 
(.0483509) 
.3056605** 
(.1621293) 
Electoral Competitiveness .3782888 
(.3281828) 
-.5993989 
(1.102284) 
Population in 1990 -.0003626  
(.0003877) 
-.0005089  
(.0013063) 
Individual Cadre Variables 
Individual Initiative  -.1726382***  
(.0702081) 
.2629693  
(.2315042) 
Entrepreneurship  -.2778119* 
(.1752857) 
1.204496** 
(.580754) 
Conflict with Government .0191172 
(.0738569) 
.1006844  
(.2489298) 
Family Income -.1637316** 
(.0757278) 
.2896086 
(.2542727) 
Education -.0591771 
(.0987552) 
.3813095 
(.3213494) 
Constant  3.084776** 
(1.400466) 
-9.329675** 
(4.660192) 
Obs 49 50 
R-Squared .4656 . 3638 
Note: 1. The entries are unstandardised coefficients.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  
Data are weighted.25
2. All independent variables are the difference between 1996 values and 1990 values 
except three variables: Lineage Diversity, Electoral Competitiveness, and Population. 
3. Significance tests are one-tailed.   * p<0.1  ** p<0.5  *** p<0.01  
                                                 
25 Weights here account for different numbers of respondents in each village.  The 
numbers range from 12 to 30.  Please see Manion, 2006:315, note 26. 
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Lineage diversity is positively related to the building of fraternal leadership.  Higher 
levels of fragmentation of lineages in a village reduce the chance of all village cadres 
from one or two major lineages, and therefore decrease the possibility of an authoritative 
and arbitrary head.  Among the individual cadre variables, only cadre entrepreneurship is 
significant, which has a positive impact on the emergence of fraternal leadership.  A 
village head who is involved in market activities is more likely to treat people as equal 
business partners than bureaucratic subordinates.    
 
Conclusion 
 
In this research I attempt to examine the relationship between the contextual factors of 
the peasant community and LCA relations.  Two dimensions of the peasant community 
are identified to conceptualize the community context.  The two dimensions are the 
transition from a clan mode to a market mode of governance, and from a clan mode to a 
bureaucratic mode of governance.  I argue that these two courses of transition have an 
important impact on the emergence of leadership or a certain type of leadership style.  
Empirical analyses support this argument.  
 
With this analysis, we find a perspective in which to understand how the political and 
economic reforms in the past 30 years have influenced the leader-follower relations in 
the Chinese countryside.  As an important form of social capital, leadership is most 
prevalent in the pre-market-reform and post-market reform stages, while least prevalent 
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during the process of transition.  And the penetration of the state power into villages 
have undermined the traditional bonds between village heads and residents and turned 
more and more village heads into authoritative bureaucrats.  These findings bring us to a 
broader question:  how do market reform and the expansion of the modern state 
influence social capital in local communities?  I hope this research can help to solve a 
piece of the puzzle. 
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CHAPTER IV 
BEYOND ELECTIONS: LEADERSHIP AND MASS-ELITE LINKAGES 
 
This article attempts to address the role of leadership in shaping opinion linkages 
between the general public and political elites, and its implications for democratic-
oriented political reforms in authoritarian societies.  Drawing upon empirical evidence 
from rural China, I argue that leader-follower relationship, as an interpersonal influence 
process, plays a crucial role in remolding the reciprocal connections between mass and 
elite opinions, even after controlling the effects of competitive elections.   
 
In the following I first discuss conventional studies of mass-elite linkages and political 
leadership.  Then a theoretical framework is provided to assess the impact of leadership 
on the reciprocal connections between general citizens and elites.  Empirical evidence is 
based on the analysis of data from the Chinese countryside. 
 
Existing Studies: Mass-Elite Opinion Linkages 
 
Although there are multiple types of linkage identified in the existing literature, the most 
studied one is the representational linkage.26  As an election-based bottom-up process, 
                                                 
26 In literature there are two major types of non-representational linkage. The first one is 
the authoritarian top-down linkage from elite to mass. Political elites shape mass 
opinions and preferences through authoritative control, ideological inoculation, 
propaganda, etc. Mass preferences are transformed to support the regime (Lindbeck, 
1962). This linkage is believed to be pronounced in authoritarian systems. The other 
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representation has been regarded as an important indicator of the quality of democracy 
or democratization—to what degree political elites are responsive to preferences of their 
constituencies (Jacobs and Shapiro, 1994; Pitkin, 1967; Miller and Stokes, 1963).  While 
the majority of studies concentrate on established democracies, more and more attention 
has been paid to new democracies or transitional societies (e.g., Luna and Zechmeister, 
2005; Miller, et al., 1998).  The topic of representation has become relevant as 
competitive elections were introduced into these societies.  Since 1987, the Chinese 
government has passed the trial version of the Organic Law of Village Committee, 
promoting village self-government and required competitive elections to select village 
officials (O’Brien and Li, 2000).  Though the actual quality of elections varies 
considerably across regions, scholars have observed significant representational 
relationship between village heads and their voters (Jennings, 2003; Manion, 1996). 
 
Competitive elections are institutional prerequisites of the representational linkage.  To 
the extent that elections provide choices, winners’ opinions tend to be more influenced 
by constituency preferences than the views of the losers because voters usually reject 
candidates who hold views distant from their own (Erikson, 1978:526).  Another theory 
of electoral connection suggests that elections promote responsiveness of elites in that 
                                                                                                                                                
mechanism connecting citizens and officials is the sharing model (Erikson and Tedin, 
1995; Luttbeg, 1968), positing elites and citizens share the same opinions and values 
because of a common life experience. Elites are members of their constituencies or 
communities before they assume offices. It is therefore unlikely that their personal 
opinions are diametrically different from those held by citizens from their constituencies 
or communities. This linkage process can take place in any kinds of political system, 
regardless of the presence or absence of competitive elections. 
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the competitive process pushes candidates to better understand mass demands and 
preferences, and thus produces agreement between officials and general voters (Verba 
and Nie, 1972).  Both of these two views are based on a common assumption: public 
opinions are exogenous to elite preferences and mass-elite congruence is achieved 
through the linkage from mass to elite.  
 
However, more and more recent research challenges this assumption by showing that 
elites play a key role in shaping constituency attitudes (Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000; Jacobs 
and Shapiro, 1994; Page, 1994; Page and Shapiro, 1992).  Elected representatives can 
not only act as a Burkian “trustee” who is independent of public opinions, but also direct, 
persuade, or manipulate mass preferences through noncoercive means like “crafted talk” 
(Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000).  That is, in addition to the bottom-up linkage, there is also a 
top-town connection.27 Representation is an interactive or reciprocal process in which 
representatives are responsive to the represented as well as leading the represented. 
Leadership relations perform a role here. 
 
Surprisingly, there have been very few academic efforts to address the linkage problem 
from the perspective of leadership theories.  This article attempts to conceptualize 
                                                 
27 This top-down process is essentially different from the authoritarian top-down linkage. 
In a representational relationship, elites shape mass preferences through a noncoercive 
and non-authoritative way; and at least institutionally, the general public has the choice 
not to be influenced. By contrast, in an authoritarian system these two factors are largely 
absent or only weakly present. 
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leadership as a dyadic relationship between mass and elite, and assess its effects on the 
representational bond. 
 
Leadership and Mass-Elite Opinion Linkages 
 
Since leadership is an influence process, as we’ve discussed, it is reasonable to posit that 
this process will have an impact on the representational linkage if representatives and 
citizens constitute a leadership relation.  Representation is based on electoral 
connections, involved in formal channels of control, supervision, decision-making, and 
responsiveness.  Leadership is a linkage based on interpersonal interactions without 
appealing to formal authority.  Studies have revealed that high quality leadership 
relations involve high levels of mutual trust, respect, and mutual obligations between the 
leader and the led (Kim and Organ, 1982; Graen and Uhi-Bien, 1995).  Because of the 
higher levels of trust, respect, and sense of obligation, it is much easier for elites or 
citizens to influence one another.  Furthermore, as presented in Chapter II, as one aspect 
of the formation process of leadership, LCA itself may have significant impact on 
opinion linkage.  LCA is the congruence between public leadership expectation and 
leadership supplies of elites.  Such an agreement may enhance elites’ ability to shape 
mass opinions about a certain policy issues.  But in what direction the influence is 
exerted, from citizen to elite or on the opposite?  I believe it depends on the leader style 
and political attitudes of those who are viewed as potential leaders.   
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In the previous chapters we’ve defined two types of leader style: paternal and fraternal 
leaders.  A fraternal leader usually acts like a considerate superior or equal colleague to 
followers.  He or she is apt to listen to people’s needs and opinions and accommodate 
more popular participation in decision-making.  The leader not only leads public 
opinions, but also is responsive to citizens.  In other words, a fraternal leadership may 
involve a two-way influence and reinforce the reciprocally related linkages in 
representation.  Nevertheless, if the leader style is paternal-oriented, with which the 
leader behave like an authoritarian father or boss, even elected leaders tend to ignore 
citizens’ preferences and treat followers in a nonresponsive way.  Then this leadership 
relation tends to be a one-way influence process from the leader to the led.  That is to say, 
the connection from elite to mass will be strengthened while the one from mass to elite 
will be weakened. 
 
In addition to leader style, leader’s attitudes toward the role of follower participation are 
important for the influence process.  If a public office holder has a positive opinion 
about mass participation, he or she may pay considerable attention to mass preferences 
and take them into consideration when making decisions.  If this person is recognized as 
a leader, then he or she tends to be influenced by followers.   On the contrary, if this 
person does not like public participation and prefer to make decisions without 
considering how the mass public think, he or she as a leader is likely not to be 
responsive to followers’ impact. 
 
 83
Which type of styles is more likely to be in the leader-follower bonds in the Chinese 
villages?  Given that LCA is the antecedent to the formation of leadership relations, and 
given that LCA depends largely on the match between a leader’s style and a follower’s 
leadership categories, different pairs of match will produce different styles of LCA.  For 
example, those whose prototype is a dictator-figure are likely to follow an authoritarian-
styled leader who tends to make decisions and enforce them in a top-down manner.  By 
contrast, those whose prototype is “the people’s representative” are prone to follow a 
leader willing to share decision-making authority with citizens.  In a society with 
considerable authoritarian cultural legacies, like the Chinese countryside, we expect 
ordinary citizens generally prefer authoritarian-oriented leaders, that is, leaders are 
mostly paternal and followers have very little impact on elite opinions.  Hence, I propose 
a testable working assumption: 
 
Assumption: In the Chinese countryside, a local official who is perceived as a 
potential leader is more likely to be paternal-oriented than a non-leader official, and 
is less likely to support mass participation than a non-leader official. 
 
If this assumption stands, the LCA constituted in the Chinese countryside can be 
characterized as a top-down influence: from the potential leader to the potential led.  
While the introduction of village elections after 1987 may have created a responsiveness 
linkage from villager opinions to elite attitudes, the prevalent authoritarian leadership 
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relations may significantly undermine this linkage and strengthen the linkage in the 
opposite direction.  Therefore we have a hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis: A mass-elite dyad involved in a LCA relation has a stronger influence 
from elite opinions to mass opinions, and a weaker influence from mass opinions to 
elite opinions than a mass-elite dyad without a LCA relation. 
 
Empirical Analysis and Findings 
 
Following the method in Chapter III, a measure of LCA is created; only this time it is at 
the individual level.  For each villager-cadre dyad, a LCA score is created by calculating 
to what extent the leader categories identified by the cadre in that village match those 
selected by the villager.  In the 1990 data, since each respondent selected three 
categories, the score could range from 0 to 3.  The higher the score, the more the cadre’s 
self-perceived leading roles match a mass respondent’s leadership prototypes.  For 
further analysis, I dichotomize this variable as a dummy, with the match score equal to 0 
as 0 and all else as 1.  If there is a non-zero score between an elite and a citizen, then we 
know there is a leadership relation existing between the two, and we can call them the 
leader and the follower.  If the score is zero, there is not a leadership linkage between the 
elite and the citizen.  
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Then we need to operationalize leader styles, which are related to the directions of 
influences between a potential leader and a potential follower.  With the 1990 data, a 
leader style score for village cadres is generated on the basis of their views of leading 
roles.  Each of the eight roles is coded as one of the two values: patriarch, teacher, 
protector, and vanguard are assumed to be paternal-oriented and coded as “-1;” whereas, 
friend, pupil, mediator, and representative of interests are assumed to be fraternal leader 
styles and coded as “1.”   Then for each respondent, these values are added up and the 
sum is divided by 3.   Through this procedure we obtain a score to measure the self-
perceived leader style of cadres.  The larger the score, the more fraternal the leader style 
is.  To make this score comparable with the 1996 values, it is dichotomized into a 
dummy variable with values no less than zero as “1” and values smaller than zero as “0.”   
 
As for the 1996 data, since the respondent selected only one leading role category out of 
eight, a different strategy of coding is adopted to make leadership relation score and 
leader style score roughly comparable across years.  Again, the eight roles are coded into 
two values: patriarch, teacher, protector, and vanguard are “0,” and friend, pupil, 
mediator, and representative of interests are “1.”  With these values we have the leader 
style scores of both officials and villagers.  For a respondent, if her score is 1, then we 
know her choice of leader style is fraternal-oriented; if the score is 0, the choice is 
paternal-oriented.  For a dyad of cadre and villager, if their choices of leader style match, 
the LCA score of this dyad is 1; if the choices do not match, then the score is 0.  For 
instance, if both of an official and a villager selected a fraternal leader, then the match 
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score is 1 and we know there is a LCA relation existing between the two.  If one of them 
prefers a fraternal style while the other selects a paternal style, the match score is 0 and 
there is no leader-follower bond between the two.  
 
Now we can go ahead to test our working assumption: the leader style of an official 
involved in a LCA is more likely to be paternal than those non-leader officials, and that 
official is less likely to support mass participation in decision-making.  We already have 
the measure of leader style: the larger the score, the more fraternal the cadre is.  As for 
support for mass participation, two survey items are selected: “popular participation is 
unnecessary” and “public consideration of only simple issues.”28  Table 4.1 reports a T-
score test of different means of the leader style and the two participation items by the 
dummy variable of LCA. 
 
From the table we can see that in both 1990 and 1996, all the three variables score higher 
with non-leader cadres than with those who are potential leaders.  Except “Popular 
Participation Necessary,” other variables have significantly different means in the 
potential leader group and in the non-leader group.  That is, potential leaders are 
significantly less fraternal-oriented than non-leader cadres, and potential leaders are 
significantly more likely than non-leaders to believe that only simply issues can be put 
forward for consideration by the general public and most other issues should be handled 
by officials.  These findings support the working assumption that in rural China LCA 
                                                 
28 The items referred to here are C6011 and C6015 in 1990 and C6011 and C6014 in 
1996. 
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tends to be established in an authoritarian style, in a style that discourages influence 
from potential followers to leaders. 
 
 
Table 4.1: Different-Means-Test of Leader Style and Cadre Support for Mass 
Participation 
 
 Non-Leader Cadre Potential Leader Cadre 
1990 Survey   
Fraternal Leader Style *** .4698795 
(.4998453) 
.3886792 
(.4877571) 
Popular Participation 
Necessary  
.5734463 
(.4952763) 
.5685535 
(.4955899) 
Public Consideration of 
Issues ** 
.3757062 
(.4849902) 
.3207547 
(.4670605) 
   
1996 Survey   
Fraternal Leader Style *** .7030201 
(.4573114) 
.2024221 
(.4021532) 
Popular Participation 
Necessary 
.5402685 
(.4987944) 
.5311419 
(.4994615) 
Public Consideration of 
Issues ** 
.6409396 
(.4801279) 
.5778547 
(.4943293) 
 
Note: Entries are means.  Standard deviations are in the parentheses.  “Popular 
participation is unnecessary” and “public consideration of only simple issues” are 
recoded to make larger values of the variables denote higher levels of support for mass 
participation.   
*** The means are significantly different at the .01 level across the groups of “non-
leader” and “leader.”  ** The means are significantly different at the .05 level across the 
groups. 
 
 
As the assumption stands, we expect a LCA relation enhances the linkage from elite 
opinions to citizen opinions.  When there is election-based linkage from citizen opinions 
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to elite opinions, a LCA relation weakens this linkage.  The dependent variable here, the 
mass-elite linkage, is measured by identifying influences between elite and mass 
opinions regarding a common issue.  The issue I employ here is their perceptions of the 
severity of local problems.  In both elite and mass samples, respondents were asked a 
question “do you think this is a very serious, serious, or not serious problem in this 
area?”  These problems include 13 survey items ranging from goods supply, energy, and 
industrial development to gender equality.29  According to Graen and Schiemann, the 
mass-elite agreement regarding “the meaning of certain mutually experienced events and 
situations will covary with the quality of their dyadic interdependencies” (1978:206).  
An important dimension of those “mutually experienced events” is problems confronting 
members and how leaders perceive these problems and how to provide support.  In 
addition, there are also methodological advantages to use these measures.  As M. Kent 
Jennings, one of the designers of the four-county survey, points out, since cadres and 
villagers live in the same localities and share life experience, “(E)lites and rank and files 
may, as shall be seen, have different perceptions, but the concept of local problems as a 
response stimulus falls within the cognitive grasp of virtually all respondents” (2003:7).  
Local problems are likely to be “common currency in both formal and informal 
communication flows” (2003:7) between officials and villagers.  Hence, here I adopt 
                                                 
29 The 13 items are: supply of goods (market regulation problem in 1996), medical care, 
income distribution, education, process, public order, birth control, energy resources, 
transport and communications, protection of the environment, equality of the sexes, 
industrial development, and agricultural development. The items referred to here are 
M2111 through M2231 in the mass data and C2011 through C2131 in the cadre data in 
1990; M2081 through M2201 and C2011 through C2131 in 1996. 
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elite and mass opinions regarding local problems to test the influences between local 
officials and their community members. 
 
Structural equation modeling has become a popular technique to identify reciprocal 
relationship using cross-sectional data.  Figure 4.1 is the basic structural equation model 
in this research.  Mass opinions and elite opinions are the two endogenous latent 
variables.  Y1 through Y8 are factor indicators of these two variables.  To identify 
possible reciprocal relationship between these two, we need to provide instrumental 
variables which are exogenous to the two dependent variables respectively.  β1, β2, γ1, 
and γ2 are structural coefficients.  ε1 and ε2 are the disturbance terms of the two 
endogenous variables.  According to methodologists of this technique (e.g., Wong and 
Law, 1999; Schaubroeck, 1990), the covariance between the disturbance terms must be 
specified in a nonrecursive model to get unbiased estimation.30  So I also include the 
correlation of the two dependent variables in the model. 
 
 
                                                 
30 As Schaubroeck (1990) argues, “the residual variation of both reciprocally related 
variables can be expected to covary. Much of the error in predicting a reciprocally 
related variable (say, Xi ) will be due to its corresponding variable (Xj). Because Xi also 
causes Xj in turn, the errors in predicting Xi will become part of the estimator for Xj. 
Consequently, the residuals of both predictor equations will be correlated. Failure to 
estimate this correlation may bias the analysis to the extent that it is large” (1990:19) 
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Figure 4.1 The Basic Model of the Influence Directions of Mass and Elite 
Opinions 
 
 
 
Before carrying out model tests, a confirmatory factor analysis is conducted to examine 
the validity and reliability of the measurement of the two latent concepts—mass and elite 
opinions about local problems (Hill and Hurley, 1999).  In the 1990 data, out of the 13 
survey items, 4 items turn out to construct a solid latent variable for both elites and 
masses.  These four are: problems in supply of goods, education, prices, and public order.  
They constitute a factor about socioeconomic issues that are regulated by government 
 91
and relevant to people’s daily life.  Statistically, the two factor models fit excellently.31  
In the 1996 data, 3 items constitute a fit measurement model of mass and elite opinions.  
These three are medical care, education, and public order.32  And all factor indicators are 
loaded at a fairly high level.  
 
Instrumental variables are necessary to estimate reciprocal causality.  There are three 
requirements for an appropriate instrumental variable.  First, the exogenous instrument 
should be a good predictor of the endogenous concept both conceptually and statistically.   
Second, each instrumental measure should be associated with only the relevant 
endogenous variable, and not directly related to another endogenous variable.  Finally, 
the two exogenous measures must not be correlated or only be weakly correlated.  The 
instruments employed in both the 1990 and 1996 models meet these requirements well.  
 
In the 1990 model, to predict mass opinions of local problems, I employ the levels of 
mass life satisfaction in the county.33  Villager respondents were asked to indicate on a 
scale their assessment of “how satisfied most residents in this county are with living 
here.”  The scale is numbered 0 to 10 to represent different degrees, from “very 
dissatisfied” to “completely satisfied.”  Since people’s opinions of macro-social-
                                                 
31 For mass opinions, x2 = .009 with df = 2, CFI = 1.000, TLI = 1.018, RMSEA = .000, 
and SRMR = .001; for elite opinions, x2 = .380 with df = 2, CFI = 1.000, TLI = 1.005, 
RMSEA = .000, and SRMR = .004.  Generally, if a model has a CFI and TLI > .95, 
RMSEA < .06, SRMR  < .05, we can say this model has a good fit. 
32 For both mass and elite opinions, x2 = .000 with df = 0, CFI = 1.000, TLI = 1.000, 
RMSEA = .000, and SRMR = .000. 
33 The item referred to here is M2100. 
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economic issues is likely to be related to their evaluations of daily life conditions, it is 
reasonable to posit that people’s life satisfaction is negatively associated with their 
perception of severity of local socioeconomic problems.  Further, mass life satisfaction 
is expected to affect elite appraisal of local problems only indirectly, through mass 
assessment of those problems. 
 
To predict elite evaluations of local socioeconomic problems, I use elite attitudes toward 
market economy,34 which is measure by the item “do you agree or disagree that it is 
alright if those who start up individual enterprises have higher incomes than the average 
person.”  In 1990 when the survey data were collected, China was in the early stage of 
transformation from a centrally planned economy to a free market economy.  This 
transformation produced a series of socioeconomic problems.  For instance, the existing 
state-owned industries were not effective in providing sufficient goods to meet people’s 
needs; the price reform introduced inflation; the crime rate went up and public order was 
getting worse; education costs rose up (Shi, 1990; Stavis, 1990).  That is, the local 
socioeconomic problems in our analysis were all stimulated by the market reform.  
These problems could frustrate people’s enthusiasm for free market economy.  However, 
one’s attitudes toward market can exert an impact on one’s appraisal of socioeconomic 
problems.   If one has a strong commitment to market economy, he or she may believe 
those problems are only short-term and indispensable costs paying for a reform.  He or 
she therefore would hardly rate the problems as serious as those who are less dedicated 
                                                 
34 The item referred to here is C3005. 
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to market system.  I posit that the more positive attitudes a local official holds toward the 
market reform, the lower levels of severity the official would perceive about those 
socioeconomic problems in localities.  
 
In addition, the elite market orientation is not directly related to the mass ratings of 
problem seriousness.  Further, these two instrumental variables, the mass life satisfaction 
and the elite market orientation, are conceptually and statistically independent of each 
other.  These two variables share a correlation of Υ = .04 and not significant.  Thus all 
the criteria for instrument selection are satisfied. 
 
For the same reason as above, in the 1996 model, two variables are selected as 
instruments.  For elite opinion, the instrument is still about the cadre’s market orientation 
and the survey question is, “do you agree or disagree that open markets produce 
chaos?”35  The more a local official devalues the chaos resulting from open market 
economy, the less likely he or she believes those local socioeconomic problems are 
serious.  The instrument for mass opinions is “do you think there are people today who 
get more than their fair share.”36  If people think everyone gets relatively fair share 
during the economic reform, they may tend to live with the problems in local 
development and believes those problems are not that serious.  The correlation of the 
two variables is Υ = 0.04 and not significant. 
                                                 
35 C3001 in 1996. 
36 M6001 in 1996. 
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Since our purpose of the study is to assess how LCA influence mass-elite opinion 
communication, and the latter is largely based on electoral connections, we need to 
specify the effects of elections.  In 1990 election data are available in 56 villages.37 
Among them, 26 villages reported experienced at least one election and 30 did not.  Out 
of the 26 villages with elections 23 reported there were more candidates than positions in 
the election.  So we can roughly see these elections as semi-competitive elections.  In the 
26 villages with elections, only 13 villages have information of the elected village chiefs 
(in other 13 villages the information of the village party secretary were collected).  In the 
analysis, election is used as a dummy variable, with 1 assigned to respondents who live 
in a village with an elected village chief and 0 assigned to all other situations.  In 1996, 
election data are available in 58 villages, all of which experienced at least one semi-
competitive or competitive election.  For the 58 cadres from the 58 villages, 31 of them 
are non-elected party secretaries and 27 of them are elected village committee chiefs.  So 
the dummy variable of election is coded as 1 if the respondent lives in a village with an 
elected village chief and coded as 0 otherwise. 
 
For the 1990 and 1996 data respectively, a multigroup structural equation modeling is 
employed to analyze the effects of leadership while controlling the influences of village 
elections.  The basic model in Figure 4.1 is analyzed in four groups simultaneously: no 
leadership and no elections, leadership and no elections, no leadership and elections, 
                                                 
37 For detailed description of this variable, please see Manion, 1996:742. 
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leadership and elections.  The first group is a control group.  By comparing this group 
with the rest three, we can see the respective effects of leadership and elections and how 
they interact with each other.  The other strength of this research design is its ability to 
rule out linkages resulting from mechanisms other than elections and leadership, like the 
authoritarian top-down control or the sharing life experience, by comparing changes 
cross groups. 
 
To examine whether there are significant differences in the parameters across the four 
groups, this model is tested in three steps.  First, estimate the model with every 
parameter restricted to be equal in all four group; second, estimate the model with every 
parameter except structural coefficients restricted to be equal in all four group; finally, 
estimate the model with every parameter except structural coefficients and factor 
loadings restricted to be equal in all four groups (Bart, et al., 2005).  Then a chi-square 
difference test is used to test model differences of these three models.38
 
Let’s see the results of the 1990 data first.  For the three constraint models, the chi-
square results are x2 = 463.555 with df = 183, x2 = 318.658 with df = 169, and x2 = 
188.055 with df = 126, respectively.  It is clear that constraining factor loadings and 
                                                 
38 The procedure of the difference testing is as follows, “the chi-square value and degrees 
of freedom of the less restrictive model are subtracted from the chi-square value and 
degrees of freedom of the nested, more restrictive model. The chi-square value is 
compared to the chi-square value in a chi-square table using the difference in degrees of 
freedom between the more restrictive and less restrictive models. If the chi-square 
difference value is significant, it indicates that constraining the parameters of the nested 
model significantly worsen the fit of the model” (Muthen and Muthen, 1998-2006:347). 
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coefficients significantly worsen the fit of the model.  So our data reject null hypotheses 
of no significant differences in coefficients and factor loadings across the four groups, 
providing strong evidence for the argument that leadership and elections do make a 
difference in the reciprocal relationship between the elite and the mass opinions about 
local problems. 
 
Figure 4.2a through 4.2d report results for the model without constraints on structural 
coefficients and factor loadings.  The goodness of fit of this model is fairly good, with 
CFI = .964, TLI = .950, RMSEA = .044, and SRMR = .047.  The first is our baseline 
group for comparisons, where there are neither the influences of LCA nor of village 
elections.  We can see the two exogenous variables are significant in the right direction.  
Only one of the two reciprocally related linkages between the two endogenous concepts 
is significant—the one from elite to mass.  Considering the authoritarian setting in the 
Chinese countryside in 1990, this is not a surprise.  In villages without popular elections, 
all public policy issues were decided and enforced from above.  Government controlled 
all formal media and propagandas.  Village residents had little access to information and 
channels to affect local officials’ appraisal of socioeconomic conditions.  Hence, without 
elections and leadership, public opinions were formed in a top-down approach. 
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Figure 4.2a: The Influence Directions of Mass and Elite Opinions 
without Elections and LCA in 1990 (n = 229) 
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Figure 4.2b: The Influence Directions of Mass and Elite Opinions without 
Elections and with LCA in 1990 (n = 575) 
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Figure 4.2c: The Influence Directions of Mass and Elite Opinions with 
Elections and without LCA in 1990 (n = 71) 
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Figure 4.2d: The Influence Directions of Mass and Elite Opinions with 
Elections and LCA in 1990 (n = 164) 
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In group 2 reported in Figure 4.2b, we introduce the effects of LCA.  Respondents in this 
group tended to perceive their local officials as leaders.  As we’ve been aware that in the 
Chinese countryside most leadership relations were paternal or authoritarian-oriented, 
we expect that leadership reinforces the connection from elite to mass, rather than the 
other way around.  That is, paternal leadership does not increase leader’s responsiveness 
to their followers.  In figure 4.2b we can see that is the case.  The linkage from mass to 
elite is not significant, while the impact of elite on mass goes up from .151 in the first 
group to .211 in group 2.  LCA does make a difference. 
 
In the next two groups we introduce the effects of village elections.  Other factors 
holding equal, we expect the linkage from mass to elite will become significant.  Figure 
4.2c supports our expectation.  For respondents who experienced semi-competitive 
elections and did not establish a LCA bond with those village officials, they held those 
elected officials strongly responsive to constituency opinions, much stronger than the 
elite influence on mass opinions.  This is a confirmation of Manion’s (1996) finding of 
electoral connections in the Chinese countryside.  Though it was still in its early stage, 
village elections had already made a considerable difference.  It trumped most of the 
effects of the authoritarian regime in shaping citizen opinions—the top-down linkage 
becomes barely significant at the .10 level.  
 
The fourth group of respondents elected their village officials and perceived those 
officials as their leaders.  Since most leaders are paternal-oriented, and they are not 
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interested in response to followers’ needs, we believe the linkage from mass to elite 
resulting from elections will be offset by the paternal leadership.  Results in figure 3d 
support this argument.  The sizeable connection from mass to elite in group 3 completely 
disappears in group 4, when leadership effects are taken into account.  
 
Now let’s look at the analysis of the 1996 data.  For the three constraint models, the chi-
square results are x2 = 498.209 with df = 111, x2 = 153.933 with df = 83, and x2 = 
137.046 with df = 73, respectively.  Again we can see constraining factor loadings and 
coefficients significantly worsen the fit of the model.  So there is significant evidence 
that coefficients are different across the four groups.  That is, LCA and elections do 
make a difference in the reciprocal relationship between the elite and the mass opinions.   
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Figure 4.3a: The Influence Directions of Mass and Elite Opinions 
without Elections and LCD in 1996 (n = 328) 
-.096 
.390***
-.549***
-.250 
Elite Opinions
Mass Opinions
Market Orientation 
Unfair Distribution 
ε1 
ε2 * p< .1  ** p< .05  *** p< .01 
 
 
Figure 4.3b: The Influence Directions of Mass and Elite Opinions 
without Elections and with LCD in 1996 (n = 284) 
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Figure 4.3c: The Influence Directions of Mass and Elite Opinions with 
Elections and without LCD in 1996 (n = 254) 
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Figure 4.3d: The Influence Directions of Mass and Elite Opinions with 
Elections and LCD in 1996 (n = 288) 
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Figure 4.3a through 4.3d report results for the model without constraints on structural 
coefficients and factor loadings.  The goodness of fit of this model is fairly good, with 
CFI = .953, TLI = .930, RMSEA = .055, and SRMR = .053.  Again we analyze the data 
in four groups: no LCA and no elections, LCA and no elections, no LCA and elections, 
LCA and elections.  Surprisingly, in all these groups, there are no significant influences 
between elite and mass opinions.  In other words, local cadres and villagers do not 
influence each other at all in terms of local socioeconomic problems in our 1996 sample.  
Neither LCA nor village elections constitute a linkage between local elites and citizens 
in rural China during that time period.  Why is that?   
 
 
Table 4.2: Correlations of Elite and Mass Opinions about Local problems 
 
Latent Variable Measures Correlations between Mass and Elite 
1990 Survey  
Supply of goods .1293*** 
Education  .1342*** 
Prices  .1251*** 
Public order .2596*** 
  
1996 Survey  
Medical care -.0005 
Education -.0171 
Public order .0367 
Note: Entries are correlation coefficients.  
* p< .1  ** p< .05  *** p< .01 
 
 
I believe we can preliminarily shed light on this question by examining the cadre-
villager relations in 1990s.   From 1980s to 1990s, the cadre-villager relations in the 
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rural grassroots experienced a deteriorating process.  In 1980s, the communist central 
government initiated political and economic reforms in the countryside.  Villagers 
benefited from those reforms.  However, in early 1990s, the center employed some 
radical industrialization programs in order to modernize its around one million villages.  
For instance, since 1994 government encouraged all rural communities to establish their 
own township-and-village enterprises.   In the meantime, government attempted to 
enforce a set of regulations and policy tasks in the countryside, including family 
planning, agricultural taxes, grain procurement, and so forth.  Those policies were very 
unpopular in the grassroots, which considerably undermined the relationship between 
local officials and villagers (see Bernstein and Lu, 2000; Lu, 1997).  As a result, officials 
and villagers developed different views of policies or local problems and the degree of 
their consensus dropped off dramatically.  Table 4.2 reports the correlations of elite and 
mass opinions of their local problems.  We can see that in 1990 there are significant 
correlations of mass and elite opinions, while in 1996 the correlations disappear. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article I attempt to explore the role of political leadership in shaping mass-elite 
linkages and its implications for political change in authoritarian societies.  As an 
essential element for regime stability, a profound study of linkage is important for our 
understanding of to what degree an authoritarian regime can survive political reform, 
especially a democratic-oriented reform.  Empirical evidence from rural China provides 
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only mixed support.  While findings from the 1996 data do not reveal the hypothesized 
role of LCA, the analysis based on the 1990 data demonstrates that LCA performs a 
significant part in remolding the reciprocal influences between mass and elite opinions, 
even after controlling the effects of semi-competitive elections.  
 
In the 1990 model, three features are salient.  First, in a society with a long tradition of 
authoritarianism, cultural legacies are pronounced in the formation of leadership 
relations. The majority of leaders recognized by residents in the Chinese countryside 
were paternal-styled.  Second, while leadership could be a reciprocal-influence process, 
the paternal leadership enhances only the top-down linkage between elites and citizens 
which has already prevailed in the Chinese system.  Finally, village elections in China 
do create a strong responsive linkage from elites to their voters, but the paternal 
leadership relationship tends to trump that connection, as the mass public is more likely 
to follow a patriarchic figure than an egalitarian leader. 
 
Two implications come out of these findings.  First, culture is important for institutional 
reform.  Introducing democratic elections in an authoritarian society have to take into 
account how culture influences the nature of leader-follower relationship.  Secondly, in 
addition to those conventional election-based or nonelection-based linkages, leadership 
provides another source of linkage.  Democratic or not, this linkage facilitates mass-elite 
agreement and helps to sustain the regime stability. 
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Yet there are questions left unexamined.  For instance, the change in election quality has 
not been taken into analysis.  Since 1990, village elections in China have been improved 
a lot, especially after the formal Organic Law of Village Committee was enacted in 1998 
(Shi, 1999).  This study has not caught up the dynamic process of the interactions 
between democratic reform and leadership.  As the elections are getting more and more 
free and competitive, what will happen for the effects of leadership?  We need further 
exploration to deal with this question. 
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CHAPTER V 
LEADERSHIP AND POLITICAL TRUST 
 
This chapter investigates the effects of leadership on political trust.  In the previous 
chapter we discussed how leadership affects the opinion linkage between citizens and 
elites.  Yet there is another type of connection between masses and elites--political trust-
-the belief of the general public that they trust their rulers.  Political scientists have 
summarized a number of determinants of trust.  As an interpersonal process between 
citizens and public officer holders, does leadership play a role in the formation of trust? 
 
As we’ve discussed in the introduction chapter, political trust is critical for regime 
stability.  Since late 1970s, the Communist government in China has been promoting 
fundamental reforms of its political and economic system.  Those reforms have been 
involved the reshuffle of interest structures of the entire society, i.e., some social groups 
lost privileges or benefits while other groups gained.  Surprisingly, in such supposedly 
unsteady and adverse circumstances, the Communist regime has remained a pretty high 
level of political trust, higher than most democracies in the world (Chen, 2004; Tang, 
2005).  Why do the Chinese people trust their rulers, the rulers whom are not 
democratically selected by the people?  Exploring this question will help us understand 
why the Chinese Communist government is successful in maintaining a stable regime 
while all of its counterparts in the Former Soviet camp collapsed.  It also will help us 
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understand the future of China’s transformation: a steady transition to an opener and 
freer society or a disastrous breakdown? 
 
Thus far there are three theoretical traditions competing to explain the formation of trust: 
governmental performance, cultural theory, and governance structure.  The rational 
choice theorists argue that trust is based on rational actors’ calculation of material 
benefits, and on citizen’s evaluation of government’s economic and political 
performance (Easton, 1965; Riker, 1990; Jackman and Miller, 1996).  “Positive 
experiences with policy outcomes, the competency and morality of political actors” lead 
to a higher level of trust (Li, 2004:234).  Here, the political or economic performance of 
political institutions matters.  To the extent that a government is able to provide good 
policies or services that satisfy citizens, this government will receive considerable trust 
and officials in the government will be perceived as “good men and women” (Fenno, 
1978:240-244). 
 
However, existing studies of China have yet to provide strong support for the argument 
of governmental performance.  Jie Chen’s (2004) analysis of survey data in 1995 and 
1999 failed to find the relationship between trust and one’s satisfaction with material life 
and local policies.  Lianjiang Li revealed that while at the grassroots level citizens tend 
to assess local cadres according to their job performance, political trust in higher-level 
authorities, especially in the central government, derives from the Confucian tradition of 
being loyal to the emperor (2004:234).  In a comparative study of China and Taiwan, 
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Tianjian Shi (2001) systematically demonstrated that traditional culture is still an 
important source of political trust, perhaps even more important than governmental 
performance.  Components of political culture, such as values or norms, have an 
independent impact on people’s confidence in their government.    
 
In addition to job performance and cultural values, there is a third line of arguments 
approaching the origin of political trust.  This theoretical tradition tends to understand 
mass political attitudes by addressing the effects of institutional structures (see Anderson 
and Guillory, 1997; Bowler and Donovan, 2002).  Political scientists have long noticed 
that a democratic way of governance is associated with trust in government (Warren, 
1999; Gilley, 2006).  To the extent that elections provide choices, voters can choose 
whoever they trust to be in office.  The prospect of reelection constitutes a monitoring 
mechanism that constrains office holders from abusing power, thereby making them 
more trustworthy.  Scholars also put forward other institutions of governance affect the 
emergence or enhancement of trust.  In her study of the impact of village elections in 
China, Manion (2006) found that not only electoral contestation matters in promoting 
beliefs that officials are trustworthy, but also informal community institutions, for 
instance, kinship relations, are important sources for political trust.   
 
It is the purpose of this research to investigate the impact informal social relations 
between leaders and followers on political trust.  The evidence suggests that LCA has a 
significant impact on villagers’ trust in village cadres, even after considering cultural, 
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economic, and institutional factors.  This chapter tends to contribute to a growing 
literature on political trust in China and, more generally, to an evaluation of ongoing 
political change in China.  In the following I will first present the analytical framework, 
then discuss the empirical findings as well as draw a brief conclusion. 
 
Trust and Leadership  
 
There are a variety of definitions of trust (Hardin, 1998; Seligman, 1997; Warren, 1999).  
Generally speaking, trust is one actor’s belief that others will not do harm to her in 
purpose, or even act in her interests (Newton, 2001).  In the political setting, trust may 
be incumbent based, regime based, or system based (Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990).  
That is, political trust refers to citizens’ belief that the incumbent officials, the political 
regime, or the political system will not do harm to the mass public and produce 
outcomes preferred by the public.  In this study, we focus on the incumbent-based trust, 
i.e., villagers’ trust in their incumbent rulers.  
 
Why can leadership promote trust?  As we’ve discussed in the previous chapters, 
leadership is conceptualized as a relationship between the leader and the follower, an 
interpersonal influence process between the two parties.  An elite-mass relationship is 
not necessarily involved in a leader-follower linkage.  According to the recent 
development of the dyadic approach to leadership, leader-follower relations can be 
distinguished from elite-mass or manager-subordinate relations in terms of the 
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contractual or noncontractual relationship.  In a formal hierarchical system such as an 
organization or a community, elites usually assume official positions and exercise formal 
authority and allocate standard benefits in return for subordinates’ obedience, 
commitment, or job performance.  This elite-subordinate connection can be 
characterized as a “contractual” relationship (Dansereau, 1975).  A contractual 
relationship is not involved in leadership, but in headship, or management, in which 
elites are not leaders and subordinates are not followers.  In contrast, elite and mass can 
also develop a “noncontractual” relationship, which is an informal interpersonal 
interaction with certain emotional bonds.  Such emotional bonds are characterized as 
mutual respect, trust, and obligation without appealing to formal authority (Kim and 
Organ, 1982; Graen and Uhi-Bien, 1995).  Only under such situation we can say the 
elite-citizen relation is transformed into leadership, and leaders are indeed leading their 
followers. 
 
According to literature on the Leader-Member Exchange theory, the leader-follower 
dyad can be characterized as a reciprocal process of social exchanges (Graen and 
Sommerkamp, 1982; Graen and Uhi-Bien, 1995; House and Aditya, 1997).  During this 
process each party brings different kinds of resources for exchange.  Such resources are 
barely material; psychological rewards, such as positive affect, respect, and loyalty, are 
often in work.  In this sense, an effective leadership relation is a kind of high-quality 
interpersonal relationship between elites and citizens.  
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The formation of a high-quality relationship begins with a “stranger” stage, then the 
“acquaintance” phase, finally the “mature partnership” relations (Graen and Uhi-Bien, 
1991; Uhi-Bien and Graen, 1993).  In the stranger stage, officials and citizens get 
together as strangers and their interactions are based on a formal basis, i.e., politicians 
and constituency, or village cadres and villagers.  Officials give commands because of 
their authority or hierarchic status; subordinates or citizens comply because of their 
formal obligations or materials rewards (e.g., salary).  That is, the relationship is largely 
contractual: officials do what they need to perform and citizens do what they are legally 
required to do.  There is no positive affect or emotion involved in this stage, and hence 
leadership barely exists in this stage.  If individuals become acquainted with one another 
and develop a somewhat more interactive relationship, their relationship enters into the 
next phase.  In this new stage, more and more social exchanges are not contractual: the 
reciprocal returns of favors are not limited to material interests any more, since 
psychological rewards are increasingly introduced into the relationship.  The two parties 
begin to share greater information and resources, and begin to develop mutual trust, 
respect, and obligation.  As this relationship grows to a higher level, it becomes a mature 
partnership, the third phase.  Social exchanges are conducted with high degrees of 
mutual trust, respect, and loyalty.  It is this trust or respect toward each other “which 
empowers and motivates both to expand beyond the formalized work contract and 
formalized work roles: to grow out of their prescribed jobs and develop a partnership 
based on mutual reciprocal influence” (Graen and Uhi-Bien, 1995:232).  In this stage the 
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leadership relation is fully developed and leaders and followers have a high level of 
positive affect and emotion, including trust. 
 
In short, as an elite-mass dyad is developed into a leader-follower linkage, mutual trust 
emerges between the two.  The stronger the leadership bond, the higher the level of trust.  
That is, leadership is a source of trust; a leadership relation between a citizen and an 
official is positively related to the citizen’s trust in that official.  Because of the feeling 
of being led, followers develop higher levels of trust and loyalty toward the incumbent 
political elites.  In the Chinese villages, where it is thick with interpersonal interactions 
and informal social networks, the role of leadership in producing or promoting trust may 
be especially significant.   
 
In the analysis, leadership relations are not directly addressed.  Although leadership 
entails trust, we have no way to measure leadership directly.  Instead, I focus on one 
critical aspect of the emergence process of leadership, LCA, and examine how LCA 
affects political trust.  Since LCA is an agreement between masses and elites regarding 
leadership categories and since we know mass-elite similarity has implications for 
mutual trust (Jennings, 2003), I anticipate in this research that LCA has a positive 
relationship with political trust.  
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Variables and Measures 
 
The dependent variable of interest is trust.  As Newton pointed out, trust has a 
“constellation of synonyms—mutuality, empathy, reciprocity, civility, respect, solidarity, 
empathy, toleration, and fraternity” (2001:203).  It is not easy to measure every aspect of 
trust with one or two indicators.  Following Manion’s research (2006), I seek to measure 
trustworthiness of local cadres as a proxy for trust.  Trust judgment usually reflects 
people’s belief about trustworthiness of others (Levi and Stoker, 2000:476), because 
people’s responses to the trust question are usually about “how they evaluate the 
trustworthiness of the world they live in…trust seems to be an expression of how people 
evaluate the world around them” (Newton, 2001:203).  So we can use trustworthiness as 
a proxy for actual levels of trust.    
 
Two indicators are used to measure the trustworthiness of party-state cadres perceived 
by villagers: positive feeling and probity.  A high-quality leadership relation is 
characterized as positive feelings toward leaders, for instance, a high level of 
interpersonal thermometer.  In this research, positive feeling is composed of 4 survey 
items that measure feeling thermometers toward party or government officials, including 
government cadres, party cadres, military officers, and officials of state enterprises.39  
                                                 
39 Items referred here are M6033, M6035, M6036, and M6038 in the 1990 data; M6033, 
M6035, M6037, and M6038 in the 1996 data.  In the Chinese system, managers of state 
enterprises are appointed and supervised by the party organizational department and 
many of them are incumbent or former governmental/ party officials.  For both 
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For each type of elite, respondents were asked about their feelings about the elite, and to 
place the kind of person at a point between 1 and 100 degrees.  The higher the degree, 
the more positive the feeling.  A point of 50 means neither good nor bad feelings.  The 
indicator used in the analysis is the average value of these 4 items.40  Since our analysis 
is at the village level, the village mean score of feeling is computed for analysis. 
 
As for probity of officials, I measure it with the mass respondent’s perception of leader 
corruption in localities.  According to Manion (2006), since corruption is highly salient 
in China, “(p)erceived corruption may or may not be a good measure of actual abuses of 
the public trust, but it does reflect popular views about official trustworthiness in a 
straightforward way that is easily understood by ordinary Chinese villagers” (2006:304).  
In the dataset there is an item about perceived corruption.  In 1990 it is asked as “How 
many of the cadres here are ‘clean?’”41  In 1996 the wording is “How many of the 
cadres here are corrupted?”  The 1996 item is recoded in the sense that the larger the 
values the more cadres are “clean.”  For each village, I compute the percentage of 
villagers out of all respondents in that village who believe a “majority” or 
“overwhelming majority” of cadres are clean. 
                                                                                                                                                
government and citizens, they are agents of the party and the state and should be counted 
as cadres.   
40 Ideally, we should have feeling thermometers toward the village head who constitute a 
dyad with the mass respondent. However, such information is not available in the dataset.  
So I use feeling about leaders in general as a proxy for feeling about a particular village 
leader.  Though it is an arbitrary solution, I believe it is at least partially reasonable to 
assume feeling about the closet elite contribute most to the general views about political 
elites. 
41 In 1990 the item is M4110 and in 1996 it is M4030.   
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Table 5.1: The Distribution of Villagers’ Positive Feeling and Perceived Probity  
 
Variable Obs Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
1996 Positive Feeling 64 64.090 7.077 43.091 76.154 
1990 Positive Feeling 64 72.258 4.359 63.487 82.526 
1996 Probity 64 .511 .141 .150 .889 
1990 Probity 64 .359 .121 .087 .600 
 
 
Table 5.1 reports the distribution of the two dependent variables.  We can see from 1990 
to 1996, the average levels of positive feeling toward officials drop off from 72.26 to 
64.09 while in each village the average percentage of villagers who believe most cadres 
are clean rises from 36% to 51%.  We are interested in examining if changes in LCA 
between village cadres and the general public in the village can account for the changes 
in the two dependent variables.  In the analysis, it is supposed to use the changes of these 
two from 1990 to 1996, i.e., subtracting the values in 1990 from those in 1996.  However, 
since “probity” is constrained between 0 and 1, a logarithmic transformation is made to 
support linear estimation in the following regression analysis.42
 
The key explanatory variable is LCA.  In the analysis, I use the difference of values in 
1990 and 1996, i.e., subtracting the values in 1990 from those in 1996.  It is anticipated 
                                                 
42 The formula of the transformation for “trust” is log[1996 fraction/(1-1996 fraction)]-
[ 1990 fraction/(1-1990 fraction)], where 1996 and 1990 fractions are the values of trust 
in each year, respectively.  This formula is following the one used by Manion, 2006. 
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that changes in LCA have a positive relationship with both of the two dependent 
variables. 
 
Besides the existence of LCA, we are also interested in the impact of leadership styles.  
Leadership style is determined by the style of leaders.  In previous chapters two types of 
leader style were categorized, fraternal and paternal leaders.  A fraternal leader usually 
treats followers as equal colleagues while a paternal leader tends to interacts with 
followers like a dictatorial father or an arbitrary boss.  As we’ve discussed in the 
previous chapters, a fraternal leader is more likely than a paternal leader to pay attention 
to followers’ demands and preferences.  This feature makes the fraternal leader prone to 
being respectful and trustworthy from the perspective of followers, since the general 
mass more likely develop a positive feeling or attitude toward elites who are responsive 
to the mass.  In the analytical model, I include the interactive terms of the leader style 
and leadership relation in both 1990 and 1996, which reflect the effects of leadership 
style in these two years.  The expectation is that a fraternal leadership style is positively 
related to increased positive feeling and probity.  Now we have our hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Increase in LCA is positively related to increase in positive feeling 
and perceived probity. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Increase in fraternal-style LCA is positively related to increase in 
positive feeling and perceived probity. 
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As we’ve discussed in the beginning of this research, in literature there are three existing 
competing explanations for the formation of trust.  In the model we need to control those 
explanations.  As for the job performance argument, previous research has addressed 
government’s performance in promoting responsiveness, freedom, fairness, 
macroeconomy, employment, etc. (Mishler and Rose, 2001; Shi, 2001)  Since the subject 
of this study is village authorities, the above items can not be applied here.  Since 1980s, 
one of the most important responsibilities of village cadres has been “leading the way in 
making rich” (zhifu daitouren).  That is, it is cadres’ job to help villagers to increase 
their family income through providing information, investment, employment, production 
plans, or running village enterprises.  If village residents actually improve their 
economic conditions and have more in pocket, they may owe this change to local 
officials’ work.  As a result they are more likely to develop a positive opinion of 
incumbent cadres.  In the analysis of this chapter changes in average family income in 
each village is included as a control variable.  
 
Another line of explanatory factors is based on the political cultural perspective.  
Political culture is important because cultural values and norms can affect people’s 
attitudes toward political issues (Shi, 2001:402).  Values and norms in a society or 
community are transmitted from generation to generation through socialization.  
Socialization process takes place through agents such as family, school, media, and 
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communal life.  In this research we focus on three agents of socialization: civic 
engagement, media exposure, and education.   
 
According to Putnam (1993), citizens involved in civic engagement tend to be helpful, 
respectful, and trustful toward one another, even when they differ on substantial matters.  
Communities with intensive civic engagement are more likely to develop a culture of 
mutual trust among fellow citizens.  This interpersonal trust “spills up” to promote 
people’s trust in political institutions or political elites.43  Putnam used four indicators to 
constitute a composite index of civic engagement: civic associations, newspaper 
readership, referendum turnout, and preference voting.  Membership in civic 
associations is important because the associations train their members to habits of 
cooperation, solidarity, and tolerance, as well as promote interest articulation and self-
government (Putnam, 1993:89-90).  Newspaper readership is an indicator of citizens’ 
interest in community affairs and readers are better equipped than non-readers to 
participate in civic deliberations (Putnam, 1993:92).  Referendum turnout and preference 
voting are measures of political participation, to what degree citizens are engaged in 
political life in the civic community.   
 
                                                 
43 Some other researches argue against this thesis and suggest a weak or non-existing 
relationship between interpersonal trust and political trust (Kaase, 1999:14; Newton, 
1999:180).  As this research focuses on village communities, where village officials 
usually have very thick interpersonal interactions with villages, it is reasonable to posit 
that a high level of interpersonal trust leads to a high level of trust in village heads. 
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In this research political participation is used to measure civic engagement.44  While 
Putnam used the turnout rate in referenda and preference as indicators of “citizen 
motivation” (1993:93-94), it is not advisable to use turnout rate of village elections in 
China to address villagers’ civicness.  In those villages, voter turnout is considerably a 
result of official mobilization, since turnout rate is one of the key indicators upper-level 
governments use to appraise how well local officials enforce elections.  During my 
fieldwork, in all villages cadres reported that when they prepared for an election, a major 
job was to mobilize citizens to vote.  For this reason, I believe a better measure of 
villagers’ civic motivation is not whether they actually voted, but how much they are 
interested in voting.  “Interest in public issues and devotion to public causes are the key 
                                                 
44 For the following reasons I believe associational membership and newspaper 
readership are flawed as measures of civic involvement in the context of rural China.  
First, civic associations were extremely unusual in the Chinese countryside in 1990s.  In 
principle the Leninist state does not allow any associations independent of the state.  As 
a result, citizen organizations such as farmers’ associations, women associations, and the 
youth league are de facto branches of the Communist Party, instead of “civic” 
associations.  Although in the past decade the party-state has moved from direct 
command towards a mixed form of governance, it is still successful in controlling citizen 
organizations in a state corporatist-style, such as personnel appointment, licensing, or 
direct interference (Dickson, 2001).  In a 2003 national survey44, out of 2459 villages 
there are around 240 villages (9.8%) reported they had a farmers’ association of 
agricultural technology.  Within these 240 villages, 67% of them reported that the head 
of the association was concurrently assumed by township or village officials rather than 
by someone internally selected.        
 
As for newspaper readership, in the data used by this research, it has a significantly 
positive relationship with probity and positive feeling, as suggested by Putnam.  In 
China, however, since most media are controlled by the party-state, and play largely as 
the apparatus of state propaganda instead of as the media of the mass, the newspaper 
readers’ positive attitudes toward local elites may be a product of the indoctrination of 
official discourse.  The official newspapers may not be able to train their readers to be 
“civic.”  So the positive correlations between newspaper readership and trust cannot be 
attributed to the civic engagement view. 
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signs of civic virtue” (Walzer, 1980:64).  Higher levels of interest in village elections 
demonstrate higher levels of devotion to community issues.  In both the 1990 and 1996 
survey, respondents were asked to evaluate how interested they were in the elections for 
the village committee.45  The average values for each village are computed for each year.  
Then the change from 1990 to 1996 is calculated by subtracting the values in 1990 from 
those in 1996.  The expectation is that increased interest in elections is positively 
associated with increased trust in local cadres.  
  
Media is another powerful way to socialize people into certain political attitudes 
(Almond and Verba, 1967).  In China, most media are state-controlled and they are 
important means to transmit official ideologies and instill them into people’s mind.  
Greater exposure to those media leads to being more affected by official propaganda and 
therefore a higher level of positive attitudes toward the authorities.  So we expect media 
exposure promotes citizens’ trust in party-state cadres.  In the analysis, media exposure 
is measured by the frequency of using media as information sources.  In the 1990 and 
1996 survey respondents were asked a set of questions about their usage of media.  The 
items about newspaper and magazines, radios, and TV are added up to compose an 
index.46  Then village average values are calculated.  Large values reflect a high 
frequency of media use and thus villagers in that village are more influenced by official 
propaganda.  Again, the change from 1990 to 1996 is created for the analysis. 
 
                                                 
45 In 1990 the item is M3140 and in 1996 it is M3203. 
46 In 1990 the items are M3070-M3072; in 1996 they are M3060-m3062. 
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The third variable that taps the impact of socialization is villagers’ education levels.  The 
average years of formal schooling for each village is computed.  Then the 1990 values 
are subtracted from the 1996 values to measure the change of villagers’ education. 
 
Besides job performance and the culturalist perspective, institutional structures are also 
identified to be significant for the formation of trust.  Several institutional characteristics 
of villages are controlled: kinship networks, competitiveness of village elections, and 
density of Communist Party members.  The coding scheme of kinship and electoral 
contestation is exactly the same as the two indicators in the previous chapters, that is, the 
diversity of surnames in a village and the ratio of candidates to positions on the village 
committee in elections.  A kinship network is a type of horizontal social capital other 
than civic engagement.  As we’ve discussed previously, smaller values of surname 
diversity reflect dominance of two or three lineages in the village, which increases the 
possibility of conflicts and disagreement between officials and villagers (Tsai, 2002; 
Manion, 2006).  I expect conflicts and disagreement reduce villagers’ trust in village 
cadres.  As for electoral competitiveness, although democratic elections do not 
necessarily produce uncorrupted and respectful officials, they do enhance citizens’ 
beliefs in the probity and respectfulness of local elites (Manion, 2006).  So I anticipate 
there is a positive relationship between village elections and increases in perceived 
probity and positive feeling. 
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Another control variable is the percentage of village population who are Communist 
Party members.  In my fieldwork, I found most party members in the village assume 
official positions or have the privilege to attend important village meetings.  Since their 
membership is decided from above rather than from the general public, party members 
in the village usually behave like loyalists of the party-state.  They are the grassroots 
activists of the party and it is their responsibility to implement or assist in implementing 
policies from the party-state.  As it stands, in villages with a high proportion of 
population who are party members, we expect local officials are more likely to 
effectively enforce upper level policies, even unpopular policies, and hence more 
alienated from villagers.  This makes officials lost trust and respect from village 
residents.  So the hypothesized relationship between density of party membership and 
trust is negative.  In the analysis, I use the changes of membership density from 1990 to 
1996. 
 
Empirical Findings 
 
Table 5.2 presents findings from multivariate regressions for positive feeling toward and 
perceived probity of local officials.  Mode 1 and 2 do not include the effects of 
leadership styles, i.e., the interactive terms of LCA and leader styles, and model 3 and 4 
include all independent variables.  The R-squared values range from .37 to .45, which is 
a sign of acceptable goodness of fit of the models.  
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Table 5.2: Impact of LCA on Changes in Trust in Party-State Officials in Rural 
China 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Positive 
Feeling 
Probity Positive 
Feeling 
Probity 
0.506* 0.053* 1.036** 0.031 LCA 
(0.342) (0.038) (0.552) (0.059) 
-2.148 0.070 -2.215 -0.033 Interest in Elections 
(2.560) (0.287) (2.790) (0.299) 
Media Exposure 2.039 0.144 1.721 0.126 
 (2.408) (0.270) (2.570) (0.276) 
0.442 -0.003 0.127 0.110 Average Education 
(1.186) (0.133) (1.363) (0.146) 
1.007* 0.251*** 1.227** 0.219*** Average Family 
Income (0.657) (0.074) (0.727) (0.078) 
0.908*** 0.068*** 0.950*** 0.069*** Kinship Diversity 
(0.189) (0.021) (0.228) (0.024) 
-1.057 -0.271 -1.305 -0.228 Electoral 
Competitiveness (1.294) (0.145) (1.363) (0.146) 
2.283 -4.744** 1.111 -4.008* Density of Party 
Members (20.098) (2.257) (22.310) (2.393) 
  1.378 -0.367 Fraternal Leader in 
1990   (3.669) (0.394) 
  -4.498 2.453** Fraternal Leader × 
LCA in 1990   (11.053) (1.186) 
  -1.725 -0.202 Fraternal Leader in 
1996   (5.762) (0.618) 
  9.797 0.529 Fraternal Leader × 
LCA in 1996   (23.349) (2.505) 
     
Constant -9.139 0.683 -1.548 0.215 
 (5.992) (0.673) (9.045) (0.970) 
Observations 54 54 53 53 
R-squared 0.42 0.37 0.45 0.45 
 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Data 
are weighted.  Significance tests are one-tailed. 
* significant at the .10 level; ** significant at the .05 level; *** significant at the .01 
level. 
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Results from Table 5.2 clearly suggest a positive relationship between LCA and trust.  
Controlling for other competing explanatory factors such as civic interest and kinship 
network, as well as village characteristics, increased proportion of LCA dyads in a 
village significantly promotes the increase in positive feeling and probity.  Only in the 
fourth model, when introducing the effects of leadership style in 1990, the change in 
LCA loses significance.  That is, as a vertical connection between mass and elite, a 
potential leadership relationship does foster positive attitudes of mass toward political 
elites, as predicted.   
 
Among the governance structural factors, the most important contributor is kinship 
networks.  Kinship diversity is positively related to increased positive feeling and 
probity.  Fragmented lineage structure in the village augments villagers’ belief that their 
local cadres are clean-fingered and “good people,” since community issues are not 
dominated by a small number of lineages.  This variable is highly significant in all the 
four models, which confirms what Tsai (2002) and Manion (2006) found: kinship 
networks are still one of the more powerful determinants of political behavior in rural 
China. 
 
Another significant structural factor is the density of party membership.  Increased party 
members in the village are related to increases in probity, as expected.  The more party 
members in the village, the more likely for local cadres to be seen as corrupted by their 
fellow villagers.  This is largely due to more thorough implementation of unpopular 
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policies in villages with more party members in 1990s, such as family planning, unruly 
taxation, and compelled development projects.  Villagers vented their discontentment to 
local officials by cutting off their belief of the probity of local cadres. 
   
All the three variables tapping the effects of socialization are not significant.  Interest in 
elections, as a proxy of civic engagement, is not significant in all the four models.  
Although in bivariate analysis this variable is significantly correlated with both positive 
feeling and probity,47 it does not appear significant in the multivariate analysis.  Media 
exposure and education are not significant, either.  Considering other studies that 
revealed significant impact of these variables are conducted at the individual levels (e.g., 
Mishler and Rose, 2001; Yang and Tang, 2006), the finding in this chapter suggests that 
at the aggregate community level, the influences of socialization on political trust may 
not be as important as that of those informal social networks, such as leader-follower 
relations and kinships.   
 
The results reported in Table 5.2 also point to the importance of economic performance.  
In all four models increases in average family income are associated with increases in 
positive feeling and perceived probity.  This is consistent with the job performance 
argument.  Villagers believe that those cadres who bring them fortune are more 
trustworthy.  In addition, as Manion’s suggested (2006), growing village prosperity may 
                                                 
47 The correlations range from .18 to .20 with significance at the .0000 level in both 1990 
and 1996. 
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lead to improved administrative performance; local officials may be less predatory and 
villagers may develop greater tolerance of corruption.   
 
For leadership style, there is only limited support for our expectation.  Fraternal 
leadership in 1990 is associated with increases in probity, which confirms that leadership 
style encourages the follower’s positive attitudes toward the leader.  A leader who tends 
to treat followers in an egalitarian way is less likely to be perceived as corrupted.  From 
the analysis in Table 5.2 we cannot find the effect of leadership in 1996, and the 
relationship between leadership style and positive feeling in both 1990 and 1996.  This 
limited influence of leadership style may suggest that what matters in determining trust 
is the existence of LCA.  The style of leadership is not so important as the existence of 
LCA.     
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I examine the role of leadership in promoting people’s political trust in 
elites.  Conventional political science studies have revealed that trust may originate from 
elites’ job performance, citizen’s cultural values, or institutional structures of the 
community.  This research contends that after taking into consideration the three 
theoretical approaches, the informal interactions between leaders and followers 
significantly promotes the emergence or enhancement of political trust. 
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Furthermore, this study explores the possible impact of leadership style on trust.  
Empirical results reveal only slight evidence.  It seems that the effects of leadership style 
are not as influential as the existence of leadership relation itself.  However, this study 
only examines a particular type of leadership style: fraternal vs. paternal styles.  The lack 
of relevant data limits this study to go further to investigate other important leadership 
styles identified in the literature, for example, transactional and transformational 
leadership, charismatic leadership, and so forth.   
 
Analysis in this research does not support the argument that socialization into a certain 
political culture is important for the formation of political trust.  Yet we must realize this 
result may be due to the level of data analysis.  While the effects of socialization are 
most evident at the individual level, at the community level they may not be that 
prominent.  Future studies of trust may want to employ the techniques of multi-level 
analysis to grasp the variances at both community and individual levels. 
 
Another limitation of this study is the measure of job performance of local cadres.  In the 
model we only have one indicator, the increases in family income.  Although leading 
villagers to becoming rich is one of the central jobs of local officials, it is not the only 
job.  Future studies may want to include cadres’ performance in providing public 
services, in reducing taxation burdens, or promoting democratic governance.  Villagers’ 
assessment of these jobs may have an important impact on their decisions about trust.  In 
addition, besides objective performance, what may matter more is subjective evaluation, 
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that is, citizens’ subjective evaluations and opinions of what cadres have done can be 
more influential than objective indicators on the formation of political trust. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Departing from conventional studies of political leadership, which focus largely on the 
attributes and behavior of leaders in Western democracies, this dissertation research 
attempts to study leadership as an informal social relationship between the leader and the 
follower in Chinese rural communities.  Conceptualized as an interpersonal influence 
process, leadership has demonstrated to be an important linkage to hold local citizens 
and elites together on policy issues.  On the one hand, the leader shapes follower’s 
policy opinion through the leadership linkage, which facilitates the formation of mass-
elite congruence with a top-down process.  This effect can even compete with election-
based representational linkage which is created bottom up.  In addition to congruence, 
leadership enhances political trust in local elites.  Since leader-follower relations involve 
mutual trust and respect, cadres who are recognized as leaders are more likely than non-
leader cadres to be perceived as trustworthy by citizens.  On the other, the leader-
follower relationship is contingent on the characteristics of the village community.  The 
Chinese village is essentially a self-sufficient human network, at the center of which the 
leader-follower linkage is embedded.  Changes in village networks lead to changes in 
leadership relations.  In summary, political and economic reforms in the Chinese 
countryside affect leadership relations, which in turn has an impact on mass-elite 
linkages.  Leadership as an informal social relationship is important in promoting 
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opinion agreement between the general public and elites and trust in officials in villages.  
Here leadership is like glue in the community that binds masses and elites together.  
 
My findings do not preclude other types of theoretical models with which to understand 
mass-elite relations in Chinese villages, for example, the electoral connection (Manion, 
1996) or the patron-client model (Oi, 1989).  My point is that the interactions between 
local cadres and villagers as leaders and followers should not be ignored.  In the eyes of 
villagers, the local party secretary or the village committee chief can be someone 
representing the state, or some powerful patron providing protections and benefits.  But 
sometimes, he or she can also be someone they’d like to trust, respect, and are glad to 
follow.    
 
Limitations of the Study and Further Analysis 
 
There are several limitations of this study.  First, the empirical part does not directly grip 
changes in the recent decade, since it is based on survey data collected in 1990 and 1996.  
After the middle of 1990s, there have been several major political and economic 
adjustments that could affect mass-elite relations in villages, including the privatization 
of village enterprises, the abolishment of agricultural taxes, and rising land disputes.48  It 
                                                 
48 In late 1990s, most collective-owned enterprises in villages were privatized.  In some 
areas it is incumbent cadres who acquired control of those enterprises, which certainly 
enhanced the dominance of village cadres.  From 2002 through 2005, the central 
government abolished agricultural taxes all over the country in order to appease the 
angers and protests of over-burdened peasants.  If this reform helped to improve mass-
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is certainly a pity not to examine the effects of those changes in a study of rural 
leadership and mass-elite relations.  As a partial remedy, in the analysis I concentrate on 
changes in most major variables from 1990 to 1996.  That is, the empirical findings are 
not based on the covariance between variables in a certain year, but based on the 
relationship between trends of changes in each variable.  For example, Chapter III 
reports that increases in attention to government have a negative impact on increases in 
fraternal leadership.  Here the focus is on changes in variables rather than on values of 
variables in a particular year.  With this method the findings can help us at least 
indirectly grasp political realities in years other than 1990 and 1996.  
 
Second, the association of leadership and political trust does not rule out a hypothesis 
about a different causal direction, that is, political trust promotes the formation of 
leadership.  Current leadership literature emphasizes the role of leadership in motivating 
followers’ trust in leaders, but does not pay much attention to the possible effect of trust 
on leadership.  In this research, leadership is measured as the match of leadership 
categories identified by citizens and behavior of cadres.  If a villager believes local 
officials are generally trustworthy, he or she possibly develops his or her leadership 
categories based on the behavioral pattern of those officials.  That is, this person creates 
the image of leaders according to the perceived images of those he or she trusts.  If this 
mechanism stands, then the findings in Chapter V will have to be reconsidered.  This 
                                                                                                                                                
elite relations in the countryside, then the rise of land disputes apparently has a 
counteracting effect.  The disputes largely result from increasing cases that village 
cadres sell collective land to developers without approval of all villagers. 
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negligence of the impact of trust on leadership certainly should be corrected in future 
studies.   
 
Finally, there is still room to refine the measurement of leadership and leader styles.  In 
the analysis eight “leading roles,” such as patriarch, friend, teacher, etc., are used to 
constitute leadership categories. Then the degree of matching between categories 
identified by villagers and cadres is computed to measure leadership relationship.  
According to the categorization theory, leadership categories are abstract composites of 
representative attributes of categories members (Lord, et. al., 1984:346).  Examples of 
such attributes include “intelligent,” “understanding,” “aggressive,” “decisive,” “open 
minded,” and so forth.  A more accurate way to create leadership categories is to 
generate composite indices based on those attributes.  In the absence of such data, I use 
those leading roles as “rough” proxies of leadership categories.  The situation is similar 
to measures of leader styles.  Leadership scholars in psychology and sociology of 
organizations have developed standardized measures of leadership styles, and the most 
popular way to address styles is to explore them along the dichotomy of transformational 
and transactional leadership (e.g., Avolio, et al., 1999; Chen and Farh, 1999).  Although 
it is political scientists who first proposed these concepts (Burns, 1978), unfortunately 
we have yet to develop our own measures.  In the analysis I create the pair of paternal vs. 
fraternal (or authoritarian vs. egalitarian) leader style based on available data.  I deem it 
as a preliminary effort and hope this effort will help to develop more sophisticated 
measurement of political leader styles.  
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In future, in addition to remedying the above limitations, there are two directions for 
further analysis which may be fruitful.  First, study leadership as social capital.   
Social capital is a recently-developed concept to account for the relationship between 
social networks and political performance.  Putnam (1993), whose classic study makes 
this term popular in political science, refers social capital to “features of social 
organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of 
society by facilitating coordinated actions” (1993:167).  Social capital is a society’s glue 
and lubricant that hold social members together and help them working together for 
common goals.  That is why social capital is crucial for regime performance, especially 
performance of democratic government.   
 
As we’ve known, leadership as an interpersonal interaction also plays as a society’s glue 
that binds members together.  According to Renshon (2000), leadership is a major 
element of social capital, and the vertical dimension of social capital.  Social capital can 
be divided into citizenship capital and leadership capital.  While the former refers to 
“those internal and relational aspects of citizen psychology that reflect citizens 
connections to each other…,” the latter refers to “the character, capacities, and 
performance of those given responsibility to lead and govern…” (Renshon, 2000:202). 
 
To conceptualize leadership as part of social capital breaks a number of paths for further 
research.  For instance, social capital as horizontal networks is believed to promote 
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mutual trust among fellow citizens.  Leadership, as we’ve studied, is a high quality 
relationship between the leader and the follower involving mutual trust and obligations.  
Does this vertical relationship promote social trust at the horizontal level?  Putnam once 
argued that any vertical networks cannot sustain social trust and cooperation, because 
social exchanges along the vertical dimension undermine horizontal solidarity and 
cooperation (1993:174-75).  He employed the patron-client relationship and kinship 
networks as cases to justify his argument.  But leadership is essentially different from 
clientelist and kinship relations.  While the patron-client tie does not produce horizontal 
connections among clients, and while kinship networks only link members within 
segregated small groups, leadership, like civic engagement praised by Putnam, is not 
limited to certain social cleavages and can potentially link members of different small 
groups, and thus sustain cooperation and cohesion in a larger society.  Supportive 
examples can be found in those charismatic leaders, such as Mao and Gandhi, who 
motivated and united people from different classes, castes, kinships, and ethnic 
backgrounds for common causes.  As such, it would be rewarding to further examine the 
relationship between leadership capital and social trust in rural communities. 
 
Another potentially profitable approach to further studying political leadership is 
multilevel analysis.  Leadership in the society is essentially a multilevel phenomenon 
(Yammarino et al., 2005:881-82).  For instance, leadership in groups can be viewed as a 
relationship between individuals; leadership relationship in groups can be seen as dyads 
or as group phenomena; leadership can be examined at an even wider context that has an 
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impact on interdependent persons.  In both theory formulation and hypothesis testing 
leadership can be studied simultaneously at multiple levels or cross-levels.  
 
I suggest there are two directions we can take academic efforts.  First, examine the 
boundaries of theories at different levels.  Levels of analysis provide a way to specify 
boundaries, or limits within which a theory is expected to hold (Dansereau et al., 1984).  
For example, if we want to explain the effects of charismatic leadership on people’s 
psychological traits, this theory is more likely to be valid at individual levels; if our 
interest is the charismatic effects on social movement, then the theory is supposed to 
stand at aggregate levels.  Secondly, we can formulate leadership theories by 
incorporating variables from different levels.  For instance, contingency leadership 
theory deals with the impacts of leader behavior and motivations on followers’ job 
performance, arguing that certain situational factors in workplaces can moderate the 
leader-follower relationship (Fiedler, 1971).  While leader behavior and follower’s 
performance are individual-level variables, the workplace situations are mostly at group 
levels.  Contingency theory is therefore a multilevel theory, although previous studies 
did not explicitly realize this fact and not interpret this model in a multilevel way 
(Schriesheim et al., 2001:521-22).  
  
In the analysis of Chapter III, I examine the effects of both village contextual factors and 
village cadre factors on the formation of leadership.  Although methodologically I did 
not use any multilevel techniques here (e.g., Hierarchic Linear Model), this is 
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theoretically a multilevel analysis.  In future study of village leadership, we can test the 
boundaries of theory, for instance, whether the relationship between leadership and trust 
is valid at the community level or at the individual level, or both; also we can integrate 
factors from multiple levels into a single model, such as village characteristics, 
individual cadre factors, cadre-villager dyads, and so forth.  In the pursuit of these 
studies, we may find a broad prospect opening before us. 
 
Leadership and Rural Politics in the Near Future 
 
A debate has been behind explicitly or implicitly many studies on Chinese politics: 
whether the Communist regime in China will collapse in the near future (Goldstone, 
1995; Huang, 1995).  As the political and economic reform proceeded in the past three 
decades, a number of factors that could lead to a regime crisis has emerged in China: 
“population pressure, declining ability of agriculture and natural resources, divisions 
within the party leadership, …the decline in the party’s direct control of Chinese society, 
and discontent among peasants and workers” (Zhong, 1996:364).  Can the Communist 
government survive all these challenges and carry out a steady transition to an opener 
and freer system?     
 
The study of leadership and mass-elite relations in villages may enhance our 
understanding of this puzzle by exploring the underlying mechanisms that bind citizens 
and elites together on policy issues.  If these mechanisms are effective enough, then the 
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regime may enjoy a stable transformation.  If the mechanisms are somehow weakened or 
undermined, then the transition will be more risky and unstable.    
 
Leadership as an interpersonal relationship plays as a mechanism that connects masses 
and elites.  Based on the findings from previous chapters, we may make some 
“predictions” regarding changes in village leadership and their political consequence 
after 1996 and in the near future.  First, leadership is on the decline in rural communities.  
In Chapter “Community Characteristics and Leadership,” we find increases in 
heterogeneity of villagers’ market orientations are negatively associated with increase in 
leadership relations in a village.  In both traditional communities and fully marketized 
communities, where members’ values or preferences tend to be homogeneous, 
leadership is fairly likely to emerge.  In a village in the transition from a “system of 
solidarity” to a “system of interest,” however, some members become pro-market-
oriented while others remain committed to traditional farming.  Cadres therefore have 
less chance to construct leadership relations than their counterparts in more homogenous 
villages.  My assessment is that most Chinese villages today are transitional—they are 
somewhere between closed corporate communities and fully marketized communities.  
The implication is clear: at least in the near future, leadership is declining in the 
countryside; there will be less opinion congruence between villagers and cadres resulting 
from leadership linkage and less trust of followers in their leaders.   
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Second, styles of leadership are getting more fraternal or egalitarian-oriented.  Findings 
in Chapter III report that increasing diversity of villagers’ attitudes toward market 
economy promotes the emergence of fraternal leadership, and increases in governmental 
penetration into village life discourage fraternal leadership.  In the former, we know the 
diversity will go up as villages are during the change to open communities; in the latter, 
however, what is the trend of governmental penetration?  As we’ve discussed in Chapter 
III, rural reform in 1980s and 1990s can be characterized as the invasion of state power 
into village life.  However, in the recent several years, we can observe that the state 
tends to retreat from direct involvement in village issues by institutionalizing self-
government of villages.  A study based on a 2003 national survey found that as the 
market transition proceeds, the local state is inclined to loose its control over cadre 
selection and resource distribution in villages (Shan et al, 2005).  As long as this 
argument stands valid, we can expect village leadership is becoming more fraternal-
oriented, which will spur leaders more responsive to followers’ preferences and 
followers will have a higher trust in their leaders, as we’ve found the Chapter IV and 
Five. 
 
Now we have achieved somehow contradictory results.  On the one hand, village 
leadership is on the decline, which weakens mass-elite connections in the grassroots and 
brings more risk to political and economic reforms.  On the other, leadership style is 
becoming more fraternal-oriented which enhances mass-elite relations.  Which side will 
take the upper hand is important for understanding regime stability in China.  
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Unfortunately, empirical evidence in this research is not sufficient to make a conclusive 
answer.  We have to wait for future inputs.   
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APPENDIX A 
FIELD INTERVIEWS 
 
The primary source of qualitative data in this research is the author’s field work in rural 
China.  With the kind help of the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy (CCAP) at the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences, I participated in field research projects of CCAP as a 
visiting research associate for around one year.  Fieldworks were conducted from August 
2003 to April 2004, and in December 2004.  The Ford Foundation in Beijing and the 
European Union-China Training Program on Village Governance financially supported 
those projects.  The research sites were mostly selected from sample villages of the 
Fixed-Point Rural Survey, an official survey system run by the Ministry of Agriculture 
of China.  My colleagues and I interviewed officials at the county and the township 
levels, as well as villagers and village cadres regarding village elections, economic 
development, mass-cadre relations, and the actual operation of the three levels of 
administration.  We did interviews in the following provinces: Shaanxi (Sept. 2003), 
Anhui (Nov. 2003), Chongqing (Nov. 2003), Zhejiang (Dec. 2003, Dec. 2004), Hunan 
(Jan. 2004), and Jiangsu (April 2004). 
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APPENDIX B 
THE FOUR-COUNTY SURVEY 
 
The quantitative data analyzed in this dissertation are from the “Four-County Study of 
Chinese Local Government and Political Economy Survey,” a collaborative survey 
project undertaken by the Research Center on Contemporary China at Peking University 
and the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan.  The survey was 
conducted twice in 1990 and 1996, in 4 counties, 20 townships, and 64 villages.  The 4 
counties are from 4 different provinces: Hebei, Hunan, Anhui, and Tianjin.  While the 4 
counties are selected nonramdomly to represent some cross-regional variance, 
respondents are drawn from a stratified probability- proportionate-to-size sample in four 
counties from four provinces.  The 1990 survey includes 1149 villagers and 59 village 
cadres from 59 villages (one cadre per village, including 34 party secretaries and 25 
village administrative chiefs); the 1996 study includes 1248 villagers and 58 cadres from 
58 villages (one cadre per village, composed of 31 party secretaries and 27 village 
administrative chiefs).  59.13% of respondents in the 1996 survey were also surveyed in 
the 1990 study. 
 
The 1990 mass data are available through the website of the Interuniversity Consortium 
for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan (www.icpsr.umich.edu).  
Other parts of the data have yet to be publicized.  For more detailed description of the 
dataset, please see Manion, 1996 and Manion 2006. 
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